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**Ministry of Finance and Economic
Affairs**

Draft Final Report
**Study to Assess the Extent to
which various Government
Institutional Reforms and
Processes are Aligned and
Contribute to the
Implementation of MKUKUTA**

Development Advisory Services
This report contains 79 pages
Appendices comprise 16 pages

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1 Executive Summary and Recommendations

1.1 Introduction

The KPMG-DAIMA Team presents this Draft Report on the study to assess the extent to which the various government institutional reforms and processes are aligned and contribute to implementation of the MKUKUTA. The subject of this assignment is to look at how the six major core governance reform programmes align with the third cluster of the current MKUKUTA, ‘Governance and Accountability’. The reform programmes which are the subject of this study are:

- National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP).
- Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PFMRP);
- Legal Sector Reform Programme (LSRP);
- Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP);
- Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP); and the
- Business Environment Strengthening Programme (BEST);

The scope for this study was clearly defined in the terms of reference and followed in the implementation of the assignment. This executive summary provides a thorough overview of the report, beginning with the approach and methodology; then presenting the main findings against the eight different areas of investigation identified in the ToR; and concluding with the presentation of recommendations. The main body of the report mirrors this structure.

1.2 Approach and Methodology

The approach taken to this study has been threefold. First, the reforms are viewed at a macro level, to look for the trends across the reform programmes. The emphasis is less on technical elements specific to particular reforms and more on management features which are common across the reforms. Second, focus is given to the purpose of reforms as change programmes. The study draws on theory of change approaches to try to understand the exact change the reforms are trying to achieve and the plan for realising this change. This includes an assessment of whether change processes are ‘incremental’ or ‘transformational?’ Third, the analysis is directed toward practical recommendations on how to make the core reforms more aligned and effective in supporting the next MKUKUTA and identifying the role of the RCU in supporting this goal.

The study is undertaken using qualitative methodologies which mainly involved review of reform and MKUKUTA documents and interviews with key stakeholders that had been identified by the RCU. In total, 16 interviews were completed with government stakeholders, covering representatives from all of the reforms. Several high-level officials were met including the Chief Secretary, two Permanent Secretaries, two Deputy Permanent Secretaries and one Director General (of the PCCB); as well as Coordinators from four of the reforms. The study

team was able to meet with 13 DP representatives, which was all but one of those that had been identified by the RCU.

The main challenges in conducting the study were in obtaining all relevant documents; organising times to meet busy high-level government officials; and then digesting a large volume of documents. To address the latter challenge, review was restricted to the documents for latest generation of the reforms.

1.3 Main Findings

The aim of this study was to “assess the progress made in core reforms’ implementation and determine their impact on attainment of MKUKUTA objectives”. The analysis contained in this study leads to the conclusion that progress in core reforms’ implementation has been disappointing. On all reforms there is a significant gap between what was intended to be achieved and what has been achieved. Government and Development Partners were in agreement on this overall conclusion. The slow pace of implementation in current phases of all reforms has not met the expectations of either party. Often these expectations have been created because earlier phases were perceived to have proceeded more swiftly.

The important qualification that needs to be made to this assessment is that on several reforms it has not always been clear how achievement was intended to be measured. The core reforms have been without functioning monitoring and evaluation frameworks for most of the period of the current MKUKUTA, making assessment of results more difficult and subjective. Similarly, the MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan has collected less than 50% of the performance information identified under Cluster III Governance and Accountability Cluster. In addition, the intended contribution of the reforms to the Cluster is unclear as the causal links have not always been clearly articulated; however logical links can be established between five of the core reforms (BEST is missing) and five (out of six) of the Cluster III objectives. Some 60% of the indicators set up to measure achievement of Cluster III relate to outcomes and indicators in the reforms. On the basis that the reforms have collected information for only a small number of the indicators for which they were responsible (2 out of 14) then their impact on MKUKUTA objectives can be assessed as minimal.

Specific findings against the scope are summarised below before the recommendations are presented.

1.3.1 Institutional Arrangements

Over the last couple of years, the government’s major focus has been mainstreaming implementation arrangements for all six core reforms into government structures. Earlier phases of the four core reforms that are now based in central Ministries (PSRP, LGRP, PFMRP and BEST) had been implemented through stand-alone, Programme Implementation Units (PIUs). Mainstreaming promises stronger accountability, ownership and sustainability than the PIU approach and is strongly supported by government interviewees. However, the transition has proved more challenging than anticipated and all the reforms are still, to varying degrees, struggling to realise the benefits of mainstreaming. The challenge has not been with the institutional arrangements adopted rather it is with making these structures work.

The institutional arrangements on the reforms are similar with the following common features: they are aligned with vertical accountability structures of government; embed ownership of the reforms in the relevant PS reporting to the CS (through meeting of the IMTC); include reform decision-making mechanisms for involving leaders across government; recognise the need for the reforms to be supported by dedicated staff; endeavour to implement through existing government systems; and have mechanisms in place for building ownership and accountability at the implementation level.

To make these structures work, part of the challenge is that the PIU culture of parallel systems has taken some time to wear away. Other challenges relate to implementation: high-level decision making mechanisms have not been meeting as planned creating a leadership gap; the reforms have not dedicated enough staff with the right skills to facilitate the reforms; existing government systems have not always been functioning well and have required additional support; some reforms have continued to require the use of parallel systems; and at the implementation level there has often not been the understanding, the incentive or the capacity to undertake the reform.

The government recognises many of these challenges and is slowly putting in place measures to address them. While the focus has been on better mainstreaming, the actual implementation of the reforms has suffered.

1.3.2 Design and Practice

In assessing the design of the reforms, the study asked: what changes are being pursued? How are these changes expected to be achieved? Is there a clear plan to facilitate the change process? The response of government officials to these questions varied widely. A couple of interviewees described difficult, transformational changes as having being the focus in earlier phases whereas the current phase was mainly about institutionalising or mainstreaming these changes throughout government—which was seen as a more gradual, incremental process. Others saw transformation as the objective on all phases in their reforms while a few saw ‘change’ in Tanzania as only possible through increments. These different perceptions are often not clarified in reform designs, which tend to be ambiguous about change goals. It is instructive to note, however, that all interviewees described the reforms as not, in the words of the Chief Secretary, ‘business as usual.’ Another commonly expressed view-point was that much of the government was suffering from ‘change fatigue.’

A summary of the vision for change contained in the design of each of the reforms is provided below:

- NACSAP-II does not contain a strong vision of how it is aiming to change behaviours rather it focuses on incremental change to further develop systems and procedures that were developed in the previous Phase (such as Integrity Committees).
- The PFMRP-III has adopted a clear, international recognised approach for achieving change in PFM. The ‘platform approach’ defines steps to be followed in logical sequence to achieve an effective, low risk, incremental change in PFM. However, the Phase III strategy is critiqued in the recent Independent Review (November 2009) for not enabling the programme to be ‘focussed, prioritised and manageable’ (page 9). Part of the problem

relates to goal and purpose being pitched at such a high level that they cover all PFM activities, reinforcing a perception that PFM is less a strategy for achieving change and more a source of financing for any activities that are a part of PFM.

- LSRP contains a clear vision—‘Timely Justice for All’—but does not contain a strong description of the type of change this vision entails or how the change might be achieved. The document mentions that the Programme will take a sector-wide approach as the delivery of justice requires legal sector institutions to work in tandem with safety and security agencies (i.e. the police and the prisons) as well central ministries, local government etc. Management arrangements are put in place to cut across the 17 MDAs (as well as NSAs) that are implementing the programme but minimal consideration is given to how to change the modus operandi of the institutions to enable them to work together to reform the Sector. Rather, the emphasis is on the opposite—‘mainstreaming’ the programme into existing administrative structures.
- LGRP-II contains a clear vision of transformational change and a strategy for achieving this change through the four programme components: (1) ensuring LGAs have the power and resources they require; (2) developing the capacity of LGAs to deliver their new responsibilities; (3) promoting citizens demand for LGAs to be transparent and accountable; (4) using existing government systems to manage reform implementation. Unlike other reform designs, LGRP-II gives substantial consideration to how to mainstream the programme and recognises the need for capacity development if mainstreaming is to work.
- Similarly, PSRP contains a clear vision of pursuing ‘long term transformation of the public service.’ The achievement of this vision is based on two main assumptions: (1) the strong political commitment of the Fourth Phase Government to the PSRP reforms and (2) strengthened lines of horizontal accountability (within government) and vertical accountability (between government and citizens).
- The DRAFT BEST strategy document (April 2008) is unclear the kind of change it is trying to achieve, however, a feasibility assessment at the end of the document describes the changes being pursued as ‘bold’ – “better regulation means changing the way Government makes policy, the way it uses regulation as an instrument to implement policy, and the way it measures and accounts for its successes”. The feasibility assessment highlights the significant challenge of achieving this objective in a context of entrenched government attitudes toward the private sector stemming from Tanzania’s history as a centrally planned economics. However, these issues are directly addressed in the development of the Programme’s strategy.

As mentioned above, the practice of the reforms is difficult to quantify because of the absence of fully-functioning M&E frameworks, however, there is clearly a gap between what was intended to be achieved and what has been achieved. Through interviews and document reviews a number of bottlenecks common across the reforms were identified: a) weak capacity to develop work plans and reports, often leading to delays in DP approval, impeding implementation commencement b) delays in funding being made available; c) inappropriate sequencing of activities; d) a tendency to focus on activities inappropriate to the needs of the programme such as training because of the financial benefits that go to participants; e) limited monitoring of the effectiveness of training and other capacity building strategies; f) activities being undertaken

that are not directly linked to outputs; f) unrealistic and ambitious reform scope; and g) ineffective management of the reform, often relating to capacity weakness.

1.3.3 Effectiveness of reforms in facilitating MKUKUTA Objectives

The gap in performance of the core reforms outlines in Section 3.2 suggests that they have had limited impact on MKUKUTA objectives under the Governance and Accountability Cluster. The overall progress on Cluster III is difficult to determine because—reflecting broader government weaknesses in M&E—the MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan has collected less than 50% of the performance information identified. Moreover, it is unclear precisely how the reforms were expected to contribute to Cluster III as the links were not clearly articulated. At a high level, the goals of all reforms broadly align with the goal of MKUKUTA to promote growth and reduce poverty. However, it is not possible to identify a clear results chain going from the reform outcomes and outputs to Cluster III goals. The indicators for the MKUKUTA goals sometimes link to reform outcomes but other times they link to lower level outputs. At the outcome/outputs levels there are linkages between five of the reforms and five (out of six) of the Cluster Three objectives. No links at the outcome/output levels could be found for the BEST Programme. Overall some 60% of the indicators set up to measure achievement of Cluster III objectives relate to outcomes and outputs in the reforms. Regardless of the lack of clear, causal links, the reforms have collected for only a minimal number of the indicators for which they were responsible (2 out of 14). On this basis the reforms could be assessed to have not been effective in facilitating MKUKUTA objectives.

1.3.4 Comparison of Reform Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks

There are no reform programmes which are currently identifying and documenting results at what could be considered an optimal level. Any assessment about the progress of reforms implementation (both positive and negative), therefore, has to be qualified by the fact that M&E information is inadequate. Both the government and DPs recognise this issue and have recently placed high priority on the development and implementation of M&E frameworks. Three frameworks have been finalised, but only two are operational. Another three frameworks are about to be finalised (NACSAP, LGRP, BEST).

Of the four M&E Frameworks reviewed, there was only one framework that was based on strong programme logic, PSRP. The framework for PSRP is rigorous and comprehensive. The main risk will be whether the government has the capacity to implement it. The strength of the frameworks for LSRP and LGRP (Draft) is that they are simple and might be more likely to be implemented given the limited M&E capacity in government. They do not attempt to monitor the whole programme, only parts of it. Both frameworks are focussed at the outcome level only, where changes are intended to take place. The limitations of these frameworks is that linkages between outcomes and outputs are often unclear; outcomes tend to be described broadly and at too a high-level; and some of the outcome indicators do not seem to relate to the outcomes and/or they are measuring activities and outputs. The PFRMP M&E Framework contains similar problems to LSRP and LGRP, although it is based at an output level and is tracking a much larger number of indicators.

The common risk to all M&E frameworks reviewed is that they will end up monitoring activities and outputs and not progress toward changes (ie. outcomes). Even the PSRP II, which has an outcomes-focussed M&E Framework, was reporting at an output level in its first annual progress report. The lack of monitoring at an intermediary outcome level has been identified as problem throughout the world and has been termed the ‘missing middle’ (Booth and Lucas, 2002). The criticism is that M&E systems tend to emphasis high-level outcomes and low-level activities but not how inputs are transformed into outcomes, which is what is of most interest to policy makers. In the context of MKUKUTA and MKUZA, Van Diesan, Mpemba and Mwisomba (2010) suggest that the lack of information at the middle level reflects the lack of a culture of policy-making based on evidence. Information at an activity level is easy to collect.

1.3.5 Synergies and Conflicts across Core Reforms

The study identified three areas where there are potential synergies and conflicts across the reforms: (a) specific technical areas, which require two or more reforms to collaborate—the study confirmed those already identified in the reform strategy documents and did not identify any further areas (eg. LSRP and LGRP working together on the harmonisation of D by D laws); (b) new systems or process that the core reforms are embedding across the whole of government (such decentralised HRM systems being introduced by PSRP or PFM systems under PFMRP) and (c) broader management issues which are common to all the reforms, such as planning, reporting, procurement, and mainstreaming. .

1.3.6 Integration of Cross-Cutting Issues

The cross-cutting issues examined in this study were: ‘gender’, ‘HIV and AIDs’, and ‘Other Diversity groups’. The latter category covers ‘vulnerable groups’ including ‘young people and children, people living with disabilities, and the elderly’. Through its support for human resource management systems, PSRP is responsible for the integration of all of these issues across government as part of implementing the government’s diversity agenda. Specific gender-related activities have been identified on five of the reform programmes, the exception is NACSAP. Although, none of gender programmes on any of the reforms could be defined as a gender mainstreaming approach leaving room for strengthening the gender focus. The main programme to address HIV/AIDs is PSRP, which is responsible for supporting MDAs and LGAs to incorporate responses to the issue as part of their human resource management practices. All other reforms recognise the issue except for NACSAP. The integration of other diversity issues receives the least attention in the reforms.

1.3.7 Equity in Service-delivery

In interviews, there was a general sense from government that not enough attention had been given to equity issues in the implementation of MKUKUTA and that Tanzania had become more unequal society. The analysis, however, shows that equity was clearly embedded in the goals of most of the reforms, particularly for PFMRP, LSRP, LGRP and PSRP.

1.3.8 LSRP value for money recommendations

The Study Teams sees the findings and recommendations arising out of the VfM assessment as sound. They address a weakness in procurement which the government recognises as a problem existing across most MDAs. The key issue is to ensure that strategies to strengthen procurement capacity are coordinated with the PPRA, the government entity responsible for promoting and regulating the government's procurement processes.

On the question of the methodology used for LSRP VfM assessment, the Study Team found opinions in interviews divided. Some felt that the assessment was useful, despite its limitations, while others felt that the limitations significantly reduced the veracity of findings. The view of the Study Team is firstly to commend LSRP for trialling new review approaches. However, we see several risks in the methodology used on LSRP which we suggest should be considered before application to other reforms:

- The LSRP VfM assessment has neither the power of a VfM audit (conducted according to International Standards on Auditing) nor an evaluation or review.
- If a VfM audit is to be conducted for reform programmes, there is a risk they will run parallel to the VfM audits already being conducted by the PPRA.
- It is questionable whether a VfM audit provides a better understanding of how a reform is progressing from outputs to outcomes, which is the key question for a reform programme.

1.4 Recommendations

1.4.1 Reforms Institutional Arrangements

In earlier phases, reforms introduced new laws, policies systems and processes. The challenge in the current phase is how to institutionalise the use of these tools. This requires a significant change in behaviour and attitudes. The BEST Programme Document captures the extent of the challenge of public sector reform in Tanzania:

“It is tempting for outsiders to assume that governments and stakeholders will assume reform is good for them, over-estimate the appetite and capacities for reform, and the quality of existing processes to support reform, and radically underestimate what it takes, particularly in the context of weak and often highly politicised policy management infrastructures” (April 2008, p.52)

To change an established pattern of behaviour requires understanding the circumstances giving rise to it. Behaviour changes only when its context changes. The new laws, policies, systems and procedures have not succeeded to change the public sector context and behaviour because: the new systems have not been owned by the government, the government has not had the incentive to implement them and they have also lacked the resources and capacity to manage and enforce implementation.

This study supports the current approach of mainstreaming the reforms into the government's existing institutional arrangements because the anecdotal evidence suggests that this approach is the only way to increase the level of government ownership and commitment. The dip in implementation performance partly caused by mainstreaming has led some DPs interviewed to raise the idea of a return to a project approach. The finding of this study is that such an approach would undermine ownership. Implementation through government structures is instrumental for long-term sustainable performance improvement. However to begin to see improvements will require:

- 1 **Visible government leadership of the reform at the political as well as bureaucratic level.** While PSs and other senior government officials understand the reasons for the reforms and support them, officials below this level who are responsible for implementation do not; nor do the long-term beneficiaries, the people of Tanzania. The government could be clearer in communicating the kind of change the reforms will bring, how individual behaviour (both inside government and outside) will change as a result and how this change will benefit Tanzanian citizens. A fairly radical change lies at that heart of some of the governance reforms: PSRP is introducing a culture of service to the public; BEST is influencing the public service to see facilitating the business environment as a part of their job; LGRP is introducing decentralisation and devolution to a previously centrally controlled government. Yet it is questionable whether the significance of these changes is broadly understood and supported across government or society.
- 2 **Support implementation through the right incentives and accountability structures.** It is well-documented how the reforms have set the wrong incentives by paying allowances for training, meetings and other reform-related activities and by engaging public servants/consultants for reform activities on inflated salary packages. This approach has discouraged a focus on outcomes and performance and encouraged the reforms to be seen as separate to routine government activities, for which compensation is warranted. The implementation of reforms should mean that some new activities are commenced while some old activities cease. The removal of the remaining parallel processes connected to the reforms will help to change the perception that reforms are additional work. The introduction of new pay reform measures, which the study team understands are imminent, will hopefully increase financial incentives for public servants to make reform activities part of their routine work. Line managers throughout the public service then need to hold their staff accountable for implementing reforms. Performance management tools have been introduced by PSRP but are not yet widely used. The recent practice of the Chief Secretary holding PSs accountable for reforms through IMTC meetings sets the right tone at the top. Putting the right the incentive and accountability structures in place and then making them work will take some time but behaviour and attitudes will not change until this has been achieved.
- 3 **Provide Capacity Development Support and Resources.** Reforms require implementers to adopt new systems and approaches and learn new skills and behaviours. While this process is taking place it is common for the performance of any organisation to dip and for implementers to resort back to old behaviour as they try correcting the drop in performance. A pattern of abortive change may often develop. To mitigate this problem, human resources external to the organisation—so they can have a critical perspective on it—who possess the skills the organisations requires can be brought in to support the reform process. Provided the right people are employed, capacity development support can help to limit the drop in

performance and reduce the time taken before performance improves. The experience of mainstreaming the core reforms highlights that an additional challenge in Tanzania is that government structures already have limited capacity. Common bottlenecks have emerged across all the reforms. This study recommends that technical assistance be engaged through the reform coordination units to areas of critical weakness in planning, budgeting, reporting, M&E, and communication, following the approach pursued by LGRP and LSRP.

- 4 **Phased, targeted approach to implementation.** The scope of the reforms has broadened to effectively encompass the whole-of-government. Particular implementation challenges are emerging at MDA and LGA levels where capacity and commitment to the reforms may be weakest. The core reforms need to be realistic about what can be achieved with the resources available and take a phased approach which focuses on only a few targeted priority areas where there is the best potential for impact.
- 5 **Monitor and evaluate progress towards achieving change (outcomes).** This is widely accepted by government and DPs as an essential ingredient. As elaborated below, putting in place M&E systems will also be a challenge.

1.4.2 Reform Coordination Unit

The Study Team found wide-spread support for the Reform Coordination Unit among government and DPs. It was recognised that its place in the President's Office as advisers to the Chief Secretary gave the RCU a level of authority from which it was able to bring all the reforms together, while not undermining the authority of the PSs. The Chief Secretary described the RCU as his 'eyes and ears' on what was happening in the reforms. Anecdotally, one reform coordinator commented that their PS had shown more interest in their programme since the CS had been chairing IMTC meetings on the reform. The main limitation of the RCU was that with only two full-time staff it was perceived to have limited capacity to be able to provide much support.

The main tasks of the RCU are described as:

- Review programme designs and to identify overlaps, conflicts, and areas of synergy between the reforms;
- To monitor and evaluate progress in the programmes, and thus ensure they are operating effectively and meet the needs of their client MDAs/LGAs
- To act as a Secretariat of the various mechanisms governing cross-cutting reforms

The study recommends that as part of these tasks, the RCU could assist implementation of the above reform arrangements in the following ways.

- **Communication:** All the reform programmes are yet to develop IEC strategies. One option would be to place IEC expertise in the RCU to support the reform programmes develop their own communication strategies. They would ensure reform communication strategies developed a consistent message about the type of change that the government is trying to

achieve and they could develop and disseminate messages from the Chief Secretary and the IMTC about their visions of change.

- **Common reform management issues:** As a part of identifying overlaps, synergies and conflicts, the RCU is able to bring together the reforms to discuss management challenges which they all the face. For example, implementation challenges arising from mainstreaming such as how reforms being driven by central agencies can embed reforms in MDAs and LGAs; progress in implementation of incentives and accountability structures; as well general management issues such as work-planning reporting, budgeting and procurement.
- **Monitoring and evaluation:** as the reforms develop their own M&E framework, the RCU can play an important quality assurance role, making sure that the frameworks complement each other and align with the MKUKUTA. As currently envisaged, the RCU then plays an important role in monitoring reform implementation and advising the Chief Secretary if they are on track. The RCU could play a further ‘reality check’ role by commissioning independent evaluations of the reforms which would provide a source of information on what was happening on the ground separate to established M&E systems.

1.4.3 Reforms Support for MKUKUTA Goals

At a high level, the goals of all the reforms already broadly align with the goal of MKUKUTA to promote growth and reduce poverty. To ensure that the reforms better contribute to the achievement of the MKUKUTA, the M&E frameworks currently being developed need to clearly articulate a result chain which shows how the outputs and outcomes of the reforms—the intermediate changes—contribute to the more medium term changes in the MKUKUTA. The challenge then is to ensure that baseline and regular performance information is collected.

1.4.4 Strengthening M&E Systems

As identified above, there is a critical weakness in M&E across government. Government and DPs have recognised this is a major problem and consultants have been engaged to develop M&E Frameworks on five of the six reforms. The development of an M&E Framework is not enough to guarantee implementation. The reforms will require ongoing M&E support. This support will need to address issues such as:

- Public Service Managers do not recognise the value of M&E as a management tool, there understanding of the result chain is limited, and there is a tendency to see M&E as requiring highly technical, often computer-related, expertise.
- Public service culture of monitoring mainly at an activity level (through the MTEF process). To change this to monitoring at an outcome level will be difficult.
- Widespread confusion about M&E partly reflected in the use of different M&E terminologies despite existence of a new government manual (see *Medium Strategic Planning and Budgeting Manual*, October 2007). The new manual (introduced by PSRP) is complex and not use-friendly.

- Ensure M&E systems are designed suitable for the capacity to implement. PSRP, for example, has a comprehensive M&E framework which may stretch implementation capacity whereas LGRP and LSRP have more modest frameworks.
- The risk, which is acknowledged by DPs, that their demand for M&E information will undermine government ownership and authority of the reforms. One PS, for example, suggested that the interest of DPs in this information was mainly for accountability purposes, that is, to provide evidence of under-performance.
- When the pace of implementation is slower than anticipated, there is a tendency for accountability to become the main focus of M&E. It is important that the learning element of M&E is not lost as this is necessary to help understand what is working and what is not and it may also make M&E less intimidating to a new audience.

2 Introduction

The KPMG-DAIMA Study Team presents this Draft Report for this study to assess the extent to which the various government institutional reforms and processes are aligned and contribute to implementation of the MKUKUTA. This introduction begins by presenting the background and context of the study before confirming the objectives and scope. The approach and methodology are then outlined and key terms defined. The main body of the report is presented in Section 3 where a detailed description and analysis is provided addressing the eight areas of the scope.

2.1 Background and Context

This assignment is one of several studies commissioned by MoFEA as part of the process of reviewing the implementation of MKUKUTA between 2005/06 and 2008/09. These studies will be used to help inform the development of MKUKUTA II, which is currently being drafted to come into effect when the current MKUKUTA expires at the end of June 2010.

The subject of this assignment is to look at how the six major core government reform programmes align with the current MKUKUTA. The reform programmes which are the subject of this assessment are:

- Business Environment Strengthening Programme (BEST);
- Legal Sector Reform Programme (LSRP);
- Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP);
- Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP);
- Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PFMRP); and the
- National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP) Phase II.

All of the above reform programmes commenced before the current MKUKUTA was put in the place. Some have been on-going in various forms for up to 15 years and all are now entering a second or third generation of implementation. The reforms are intended to improve performance results and accountability in public service delivery. The experience and lessons of the past have led, in the current phase, to efforts to strengthen ownership and to mainstream and integrate implementation into the government's national planning and budgeting process. In addition, other processes such as the Public Expenditure Review (PER) system which are critical to the effective implementation of MKUKUTA have been introduced

MKUKUTA is built around a broad range of outcomes organised into the following three clusters:

- I. Growth and Reduction of Income Poverty
- II. Improvement of Quality of Life and Social Well-being

III. Governance and Accountability.

To measure performance against the outcomes under these three clusters, the Government has developed a Poverty Monitoring System to cut across activities of the MDAs, including the reform programmes. In addition, each a reform programme has their own Monitoring and Evaluation system.

2.2 Objectives of Study

The aim of this study is to “**assess the progress made in core reforms’ implementation and determine their impact on attainment of MKUKUTA Objectives**”. This will include an assessment of the leadership and capacity of the government to manage the large number of reform programmes currently in place.

2.2.1 Scope of Study

To achieve these objectives, the study focuses on the areas that have been clearly identified in the Terms of Reference and will undertake the following tasks:

- i. Review the institutional arrangements for implementing core reforms;
- ii. Assess the design and practice (eg. current pace) of core reforms implementation and identify bottlenecks or impediments;
- iii. Review if (i) and (ii) above are in line with attainment of MKUKUTA objectives by looking at effectiveness of these reforms in facilitating intended MKUKUTA objectives and hence contribute to better governance;
- iv. Compare the monitoring and evaluation framework of each core reform programme and assess if results are well identified and documented;
- v. Identify overlaps, conflicts, synergic opportunities and cross-cutting issues of core reforms and suggest appropriate actions;
- vi. Identify and study the cross-cutting issues in the core reforms and the extent to which these issues have significantly been integrated and addressed;
- vii. Assess whether the current core reform objectives are in line with the goals of attainment of equity in accessing service-delivery;
- viii. Study the finding of the value for money audit of LSRP and compare recommendations for the benefit of other core reforms.

2.2.2 Recommendations

On the basis of the analysis completed in 2.2.1 above, the study will then make practical recommendations for:

- Institutional Arrangements of the reforms
- The role of the Reform Coordination Unit
- How the reforms can better support MKUKUTA Goals
- Measure for strengthening the M&E Systems of the reforms

2.3 Approach and Methodology

The approach taken to this study has been threefold. First, the reforms are viewed at a macro level, to look for the trends across the reform programmes and to obtain lower level details where required to validate, verify and illustrate broader trends. This has meant the focus is less on technical elements specific to particular reforms and more on management features which are common across the reforms. The time constraints on this assignment also prevent a more thorough and detailed analysis at a lower level.

Second, this study tries to contribute a different perspective to the ongoing discussions on the reforms by starting the analysis from the premise that the reforms are trying to achieve change. The study endeavours to investigate what kind of change the reforms are trying to achieve and how the desired change is intended to be realised. Below the main different categories of change, such as ‘incremental’ versus ‘transformational’, are defined as they will be applied in this study. We also present the ‘theory of change’ approach which this basis used to examine the question of how change in the reforms is expected to occur.

Third, the aim is to synthesise the learning from past experience with a view to devising recommendations that are practical for the purpose of achieving greater alignment between reform programmes and MKUKUTA II and the future role of the RCU in coordinating the reforms.

2.3.1 Methodology

Qualitative methodologies are employed in this study including review of documentation; interviews with key stakeholders involved in the implementation of the reform programmes; as well as Development Partners and other key stakeholders.

After the first interviews were conducted, an “Interview Guide” was developed for use in all subsequent interviews (see Annexure G). The guide was not used as a prescriptive questionnaire but rather as an open-ended list of questions to guide discussion, ensures that the issues raised in the ToR are addressed and bring consistency to all the interviews conducted.

Interviews were conducted with 16 government representatives and 15 DPs. Organising meetings with busy high-level government officials covering all of the reforms proved one of the major challenges in conducting the study and took much longer than had been anticipated. In the end, the study team was able to meet with at least one (and normally two) government representatives from each of the reforms. Several high-level officials were met including the Chief Secretary, two Permanent Secretaries, two Deputy Permanent Secretaries and one Director General (of the PCCB); as well as Coordinators from four of the reforms. The study team was able to meet with all but one of the DP representatives identified by the RCU.

Obtaining relevant reform documents and reports was also a challenge in several cases. Originally the study team was advised to obtain these directly from the Reform Coordinators, rather than centrally from the RCU. In the end, the study team were not able to obtain several documents this way but most were able to be supplied by the RCU or the DPG Secretariat. To try to manage the volume of documents to be reviewed, the study has mainly focussed on the reform documents which are current and not looked in any particular detail at reform documents from past phases.


2.3.2 Key Terms and Concepts

2.3.2.1 Types of Change

The analysis contained in this study is based on the premise that the reforms are trying to achieve change. However, not all change is the same. Analysing the type of change that the reform strategies are designed to achieve can help build understanding about the experience of implementation as well as help shape common expectations among stakeholder about what can be achieved. The categories of change used in this study and the characteristics which define them are summarised as follows¹:

(a) Abortive Change: is an all too commonly experienced type of change. Most organisations at some time have suffered from projects and initiatives that fail, are aborted, or fall far short of their anticipated outcomes. Symptoms of abortive change include: change fatigue; increased cynicism and resistance from staff to the latest ‘fad’; low morale; decreased performance; and failure to complete project after project.

Diagram 1: Abortive Change



¹ The following definitions of change are drawn from KPMG materials.


(b) Incremental Change: can be an effective, low risk strategy for achieving change. Incremental change normally involves doing established processes better. The advantage of this approach to change is that it requires relatively little organisational pain; has a low risk of causing large scale failure; the end state is very clear from the beginning; and it can break the cycle of cynics.

Diagram 2: Incremental Change



(c) Transitional Change: is the next step up in complexity from incremental change. This involves a distinct ‘step change’ between an old way of doing things and a new, entirely different mode of operation. It is generally implemented to fix a specific problem. While human related factors still exist with this type of change, they tend to be not as prevalent as more complex types of change. However, unlike incremental change, if these human factors are ignored then the performance of the organisation can significantly suffer. Typical challenges involved in this sort of change include: resistance, if no valid case for change is made; lack of skills to function under the new the initiative; inadequate understanding of expectations of performance; lack of support once the initiative is in place; and inertia or simple fear of failure.


Diagram 3: Transitional Change



(d) Transformational Change: promises the greatest benefits but also bring the greatest risks. There is almost always a performance dip in the initial stages of implementing a

transformational change process. In an ideal scenario, however, the ‘bounce back’ in performance is strong and delivers benefits far greater than the original situation. Transformational change is so significant that in order for it to be successful the culture, perceptions and behaviour of staff must radically alter from their current situation. Additional resources are often required to manage a transformational change process.

Diagram 4: Transformational Change



2.3.2.2 Theory of Change Approach

The analysis of change is developed further by application of some of the ideas of a ‘theory of change’ (TOC) approach. This approach is gaining some currency as a way of trying to increase understanding of how change occurs in complex environments. The premise of this approach is that all programmes are designed and implemented based on theories of change, but these theories are often not clearly stated. Rather ideas about how change may happen remain implicit, often confused and even missing.

Theories of change consist of: (a) what the programme does, that is, the actions (outputs); (b) the triggers that are expected to influence change; (c) outcomes and (d) context. For example, a training workshop is something that the programme does but a trainee’s desire to perform is what triggers the trainee to apply new knowledge and skills in the workplace. If the trainee does not have the desire to perform, then the desired programme outcomes may not be achieved. The context is an important element since the work environment may not support the triggers working, for example, the trainee may not be given opportunity to apply their newly learned skills. At times, several triggers may be necessary to achieve change.

In contrast with classic (positivist, scientific) approaches, the TOC approach does not look to find definite causal relationships between programme actions and outcomes to explain and predict changes. Rather, TOC is premised on a perspective that it is not possible to be all-knowing in complex environments. Yet discussions around possible theories of change can increase stakeholders’ understanding. This study tries to make explicit some of the key assumptions which seem to underpin the reform programmes—particularly the linkages made between the programmes actions (outputs), the ‘triggers’ which are expected to generate change and then the outcomes while also being cognisant of the reform context.

2.3.2.3 *Monitoring and Evaluation Vocabulary*

Different M&E terminology tends to be in used across the reform programmes. For the purposes of this study, the following terms and definitions have been used:

- **Outcomes**—define the changes that are desired, for example in the organisational behaviour of public service institutions.
- **Outputs**—are the ‘products’ or ‘services’ that are produced from a series of activities. Several outputs often contribute to an outcome.
- **Programme logic**—refers to the ‘if-then’ relationship between inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes. For example: *if X inputs are provided then X activities will be completed; if these activities are completed, then X output will be produced. If X outputs are produced then X outcome will result.*

In the documents reviewed the terms impact and goal are also used. These are long term outcomes. Results chains are a term used by several interviewees, this is the programme logic.

These definitions are broadly consistent with, although a simplified version of, those contained in the Government’s *Medium Strategic Planning and Budgeting Manual* (October 2007).

2.3.2.4 *Effectiveness*

This study uses the definition of ‘effectiveness’ provide by the DAC Evaluation Criteria:

A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives. In evaluating the effectiveness of a programme or a project, it is useful to consider the following questions: (a) to what extent were the objectives achieved/ are likely to achieve? (b) What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?

3 Findings across the Reform Programmes

This section represents the main body of the report and provide detailed description and analysis of the eight areas identified in the scope of services in the ToR. The analysis is complemented by summary tables contained in the Annexure. The areas of the scope are covered in the following order:

- Institutional Arrangements
- Design and Practice
- Effectiveness of reforms in facilitating MKUKUTA Objectives
- Comparison of Reform Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks
- Synergies and Conflicts across Core Reforms
- Integration of Cross-Cutting Issues
- Equity in Service-delivery; and
- LSRP value for money recommendations

3.1 Institutional Arrangements of Core Reforms

To frame the description of the institutional arrangements for the core reforms, this section begins with a brief description of the key institutional arrangement for the implementation of Cluster III of the MKUKUTA before examining each of the six core reforms in turn. A table summarising institutional arrangements is contained in Annex B.

3.1.1 MKUKUTA Institutional Arrangements

The MKUKUTA provides a national, government-led framework for reducing poverty and promoting development in line with the MDGs of 2015 and Vision 2025. Three main outcome areas or ‘clusters’ provide the focus: (i) growth and reduction of income poverty; (ii) improvement of quality of life and social well-being; (iii) governance and accountability. The three clusters are closely inter-linked, with the third cluster providing the preconditions necessary for achievement of the other two.

The MKUKUTA is to be implemented through the strategic plans and programmes of the MDAs and LGAs, ultimately under the oversight of Parliament (through Parliamentary committee). MKUKUTA priorities are incorporated by MDAs into the guidelines for the preparation of MTEFs, and Annual Plans and Budgets. Progress against the MKUKUTA (as documented through the Poverty Monitoring System) feeds into the Public Expenditure Review Process (PER) and this, in turn, informs the preparation of budget guidelines. The JAS

processes set up to harmonise and align DP assistance also feed into the PER process. For those DPs contributing to the government's budget, an added mechanism is the Performance Assessment Framework, which incorporates specific indicators that are generally drawn from the MKUKUTA, discussed and agreed between the Government and DPs on an annual basis (check). The harmonised aid architecture contained in the MKUKUTA (and JAS-check) is premised on robust process for PER, MKUKUTA, Sector Reviews and sustained core reform programmes.

3.1.2 Enhanced National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan

The purpose of the Enhanced National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP) is to implement the Government's National Anti-Corruption Policy by 'strengthening the mechanisms and processes for the prevention and combating of corruption.' The first phase of NACSAP commenced in 2001 and finished in 2005. Now in its second phase, NACSAP was revised in June 2008 to sharpen the focus and address changes to the anti-corruption landscape (such as the introduction of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (No 11/2007)). NACSAP operates across the whole of government and also seeks to engage with civil society, the private sector and the media.

Key institutional arrangements are:

- **High-level government leadership:** is vested in a National Steering Committee, which is chaired by the Director General of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and includes the Good Governance Coordination Unit (GGCU) as well as representatives from the other four core governance reforms (PMO-RALG, LSRP, PFMRP, LGRP); MKUKUTA Secretariat; UNDP and other Development Partners (SIDA); and civil society, the media and the private sector. Under the guidance of the Steering Committee, the Director General of the PCCB along with the Coordinator of the GGCU and the Director of Public Prosecutions share the responsibility for the implementation of NACSAP.
- **Coordination:** The two key institutions responsible are the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), an independent organisation established by statute,² and the Good Governance Coordination Unit (GGCU) in the President's Office. The role of the PCCB is broadly defined as day to day implementation, which is performed through an Implementation Unit. The primary responsibility of the GGCU is to collate bi-annual reports (received from the PCCB) and report progress to the Chief Secretary (and, through him, the President).
- **Implementation:** All MDAs, LGAs, parastatals and other government organisations to develop anti-corruption work plans and write progress reports. The PCCB has offices in all districts of the country through which support is delivered to LGAs.

² The PCCB is established under the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (No 11/2007) to work with public, parastatal and private organisation to: examine their practices and advise them on how to prevent and combat corruption; and, under the Director of Public Prosecutions, investigate and prosecute offences under the Act.

NACSAP is not a programme, but an action plan to bring together a range of stakeholders working in the areas of corruption. The responsibility for leading the action plan is never really clear. The PCCB is described as the lead and have created a NACSAP Implementation Unit. But GGCU brings the authority of being based in the office of the President, though there role is described as monitoring and collating reports from the MDAs. There is a risk of overlap of responsibilities and confused lines of accountability between the PCCB and the GGCU. There is also potentially an overlap between the monitoring roles of the GGCU and the RCU. One option would be for the GGCU to become part of the RCU and the PCCB to be given full responsibility for NACSAP.

3.1.3 Public Financial Management Reform Programme Phase III

As defined in the logframe, the goal of Phase III is: “Improvement in the efficiency, effectiveness of the allocation of resources to achieve more equitable and improved public service delivery”. The purpose is: “To ensure greater predictability and availability of medium term resources to executing agencies utilising operationalised ‘best practice’ PFM systems, which demand delegated financial autonomy and accountability in MDAs and LGAs by 2010.”

Key institutional arrangements are:

- **High-level Government Leadership:** a Steering Committee, which meets quarterly, and consists of the PS of MoFEA; the chairs of the Steering Committees of PSRP, LGRP, LSRP; the PS of PO and Cabinet Secretariat; and the chair of the PFM RP DPG. The Steering Committee also forms a Technical Working Group, which meets prior to the Steering Committee.
- **Coordination:** is the responsibility of MoFEA Deputy PS-Reform, a newly created position dedicated full-time to the implementation of the Programme. A Programme Manager drawn from the Planning Division of MoFEA will also be working on PFM RP full-time, managing the PCO/Secretariat which will be attached to this Division.
- **Implementation:** is the responsibility of institutions which are a part of the PFM cycle: BoT, MoFEA, line Ministries, LGAs and oversight bodies such as NAO, PPRA and Parliament. As the reform is embedded in the central agencies it is anticipated that the focus will move to the MDAs and LGAs and Change Managers will be appointed in these institutions.

In the preceding PFM RP phase, which commenced in mid 2004, management responsibility shifted from a stand-alone, ‘Programme Implementation Unit’ to the government entities under a mainstreamed model. The experience, however, was that the management responsibilities and accountabilities were not clearly articulated and understood between reform implementer, coordinators and leaders; and additional technical and other management resources were required to facilitate the reforms.

In the current PFM RP phase, which commenced mid-2008, the above institutional arrangements attempt to address some of these problems in the earlier phase. However, by the time of this Study, these arrangements were yet to be operationalised. Two key positions in the Secretariat

(the Programme Manager and Programme Coordinator) were only appointed at the end of 2009. The Steering Committee has met once (instead of twice a year) and meetings of the Technical Working Group, which have been frequent, are considered by GoT to have been unproductive, as they have mainly been focussed on concerns raised by DPs. Despite the long time taken to mainstream programme, the Study agrees with the recent PFMRP Independent Review that the Secretariat be given further time to establish itself and the institutional arrangements not be changed.

3.1.4 Legal Sector Reform Programme

The Medium Term Strategy (MTS) and Action Plan (2005/06-2007/08) of the Legal Sector Reform Programme (LSRP) were launched in December 2004. However, delays meant that the Programme did not commence until late FY 2006/07 and because of this, it is likely to be extended until 2011/12. The aim of the LSRP MTS is to promote timely and accessible justice for all by supporting social justice, equality and the rule of law and by providing quality and accessible legal services.

Key Institutional Arrangements are:

- **High-level Government Leadership:** is provided by three-tiered committee structure, the apex of which is the Steering Committee, with the Chief Justice as the Chair; then the Joint Programme Implementation Review Committee (JPIRC); and the Technical Coordination Committee (TCC). However, the recent Mid-Term Review concluded that there has been a void in the strategic leadership of LSRP because these high-level decision making bodies have met too infrequently to provide the strategic direction the reform requires.
- **Coordination:** is over-sighted by the PS of MoCAJ through the Programme Coordination Office (PCO). The role of MoCAJ as the coordinating Ministry has, if anything, been strengthened by recent changes in structure especially the separation of the Attorney General's Chambers from the Ministry As defined in the MTR, the PCO is the fulcrum around which programme revolves. The lack of capacity within the unit to provide technical backstopping to the Implementing Institutions and facilitate the reform process has been identified in successive reviews as critical constraint on implementation. This unit is about to have its capacity to significantly increased with the engagement of seven TA (CTA, Finance, Procurement, Gender, M&E, MIS, and Capacity Development).
- **Implementation.** Is the responsibility of 17 MDAs who are grouped under five Key Result Areas. In each KRA, one MDA is designated as the lead with responsibility for coordinating the others. It seems that most Lead agencies have struggled to perform their role in coordinating Implementing Agencies to implement activities. Lack of capacity within institutions has meant that the institutions have been demanding support from the PCO which, to date, this unit has not had the capacity to provide.

3.1.5 Local Government Reform Programme

The first phase of the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) ran from 1998 to 2008. The programme is currently transitioning to a second phase which will run from July 2009 to

June 2014. The Programme is the mechanism for implementing the Governments' Decentralisation by Devolution (D by D) policy, which from its inception in 1996 introduced a major transformation in the structure of government and responsibility for delivery of services. The *Vision, Goals and Strategy* document (September 2009), contains a logframe which present the goal for phase II as: "Accelerated and equitable socio-economic development, public service delivery and poverty reduction across the country" and the purpose is: 'to transform LGAs to competent strategic leaders and coordinators of socio-economic development, accountable and transparent service delivery and poverty reduction interventions in their areas of jurisdiction'.

Key institutional arrangements are:

- **High-level government leadership:** Perhaps more than the other cross-cutting reforms, the strategy document for LGRP-II strongly identify responsibilities for the strategic leadership of the programme as resting with the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee and the Chief Secretary. The rationale is that this programme involves such a significant shift in responsibilities and financial resources (away from central and sector ministries to LGAs), that highest decision-making body within the public service is the only such body with the authority to drive the changes. The Chief Secretary is monitor implementation progress and holds the relevant PS's accountability through a special meeting IMTC meeting to be held every quarter which will be devoted to all six cross-cutting reforms. The strategy document also articulates the importance of the RCU and the Cabinet Secretariat to support the Chief Secretary through information and advice on reform progress. Governance structures set up with exclusive responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the LGRP are: the Programme Implementation Coordination Committee, chaired by the PS PMO; and the LGRP II Common Basket Fund Steering Committee.
- **Coordination:** PMO-RALG has the mandate for the management and coordination of LGRP. Sector MDAs also need to include D by D in their Strategic Plans and are responsible for building the capacity of LGAs in technical and professional areas to deliver services (and monitor them).
- **Implementation:** is the responsibility of Sector MDAs and LGAs. To coordinate across the whole-of-government inter-ministerial task teams were set up under Phase I. In Phase II, these team are to be continued for fiscal decentralisation; human resource management decentralisation; legal harmonisation; local governance; with an addition task team developed for 'decentralisation, monitoring and evaluation. Central-Local Consultative Platform is to be established as mechanism for exchange of views on policy and implementation issues between the central and local government levels in order to break down the top-down culture which has characterised Government of Tanzania in the past.

The key change in the institutional arrangements of Phase II compared with Phase I is that responsibility for implementation has been mainstreamed into PMO-RALG. PMO-RALG has been restructured to take on this responsibility with a significant number of positions having been created, many of which have still not been filled. Capacity is to be developed through the engagement of large team of national and international TA, who will be base in PMO-RALG and the Regional Secretariats.

3.1.6 Public Sector Reform Programme

The current Public Sector Reform Programme followed a large Civil Service Reform Programme which had been implementing major cost-cutting and restructuring measures since 1991. Commencing in 1999, the focus of the current programme shifted to improving management systems and processes to bring a more effective and better quality of service delivery to citizens. Now in a second phase which commenced in 2008, the goal of PSRP-II is: “MDAs deliver improved services (in terms of quality, timeliness and efficiency), implement relevant, priority policies, and establish a predictable and well regulated environment for private sector growth and social development.”

Key institutional arrangements:

- **High-level government leadership:** the PSRP Management Committee is responsible for the overall strategic direction of the Programme, chaired by the PS PO-PSM. The PMC Sub-Committee on Resources has responsibility for reviewing and approving plans, budgets and performance reports and audits. Another body, called the Programme Implementation Review is responsible for monitoring day to day implementation of PSRP. The Strategy document also highlights the important role of the IMTC to ensure coordination of all reform programmes and identifies the responsibilities of the RCU to support the Chief Secretary in performing his role.
- **Coordination:** The role of PO-PSM is to manage and coordinate the reforms. They are responsible for developing tools, frameworks and innovations to be adopted at the MDA level. They support and facilitate the MDAs to plan for and implement the reforms.
- **Implementation:** Feedback on the first phase was that the MDAs saw the reform as being driven and owned by PO-PSM. In setting up the institutional arrangement for the second phase, then, a key consideration was how to embed ownership and reform demand at the MDA level. The solution outlined in the PSRP Medium Term Strategy was to create process by which the 90 MDAs would identify and develop their own customised public sector reform interventions as a part of their strategic planning process. The role of PO-PSM would be to ensure PSRP reform priorities are understood by the MDAs and then to facilitate them to select and plan their interventions. According the strategy document, each of the MDAs responsible for the six core reforms is to send a memo to all MDAs—at the same time as the MoFEA circular on strategic plan preparation—which guides them on the potential impact of the reform on their strategies.

DPs commented that the location of PSM in the PO gives it leverage. In the last year, the pace of implementation has slowed. This is partly related to the demand-driven approach of Phase II. The MDAs are not currently demanding much reform. Also the programme was easier in the preceding phase (less about changing behaviour) and has been expanded from 67 to 90 agencies.

3.1.7 Business Environment Strengthening in Tanzania

The BEST Programme is in a transitional period from the first to the second phase. The first phase was approved by government in December 2003 and ended in June 2008. DPs’ financial commitments to Phase II are conditional on the government addressing “institutional issues”

and meeting “implementation benchmarks” that were agreed in an ‘Implementation Support Mission’ (ISM) undertaken by DPs in December 2008. Two subsequent ISM visits have been conducted in May and November 2009. The conclusion of the most recent ISM visit was that BEST implementation progress was still ‘marginally unsatisfactory’.

The Programme Strategy Document and Logframe obtained by the study team are still at a draft stage. Key institutional arrangements have changed significantly from phase one and are still being bedded down:

- **High-level Government Leadership:** the Tripartite Review Committee is the most senior decision-making forum for the BEST Programme and consists of government, DPs and private sector. The BEST Steering Committee is responsible for technical oversight and provides advice on issues for decision making in the TRC. Both meetings are intended to take place quarterly although the ISM Aid Memoire (November 2009) notes that the meeting have not been taking place with the intended frequency. Responsibility for the delivery of BEST has now been placed under the PS of the PMO.
- **Coordination:** responsibility under Phase I rested with the Business Regulatory Unit, a PIU which was outside government structures. For Phase II, responsibility has assigned to a new unit, the Private Sector Development and Investment Division (PSDID), created under the PMO, supported by a unit of consultants called, Business Regulatory Services (BRS). The function of PSDID is defined as quite different from the BRU in the role of providing a link between government and the private sector, undertaking policy analysis and providing regulatory impact services to MDAs. However, the recent ISM observed that the PSDID staff were not clear on how they would perform these new functions and identified a risk that it could end up replicating the functions performed by the BRU. The BRS supports the PSDID providing “continuous pro-active and yet demand driven identification and analysis of areas that need reform” (p.47)
- **Implementation:** is at the MDA-level through the government’s MTEF budgeting and planning processes and using existing system such as those relating to procurement. BEST needs to engage with all MDAs to institutionalise the practice of Regulatory Impact Assessments. The ISM reports that there has been confusion over responsibilities between the PSDID and MDAs. This is to be resolved with the drafting of MOU. The main institutions for Component 1: Business Regulatory Reform is: NIDA, Regulatory Impact Assessment (RITA), Business Registrations and Licensing Agency (BRELA), and the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Unit in the Ministry of Industry Trade and Marketing. The key agency for Component 2: Land Reform is the Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Human Settlements Development. Key agencies for Component 3: Commercial Dispute Resolution, are MoCAJ. Many of the reforms in this component involve the Judiciary. A BEST Project Governance Unit has been set up in the Judiciary to supervise reforms. Labour Law Reform in Component 4 mainly involves the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Youth Development—a Component Coordination Committee has been set up to streamline coordination between the departments in this Ministry. Tanzania Investment Centre is responsible for Component 5. Government of Zanzibar responsible for Component 6.

3.1.8 Summary of Reform Institutional Arrangements

Over the last couple of years, the government's major focus has been mainstreaming arrangements for reform implementation into government institutions. Earlier phases of four of the reforms (the exceptions are NACSAP and LSRP) were implemented through stand-alone, Programme Implementation Units. The process of transferring responsibility has proved a more challenging exercise than anticipated and all the reforms are still, to varying degrees, still in the process of mainstreaming. However, the challenge has not been in designing arrangements that fit with the leadership, accountability and responsibility structures of government rather it is in making these structures work.

Each of the reform programmes has similar institutional arrangements. The key features of these arrangements are:

- **High-level government ownership and leadership:** of the reform expressed through a Steering Committee normally chaired by PS of the Ministry responsible for the reform but including PSs from other Ministries involved in implementation (and including PSs from the other core reforms) and relevant DPs.
- **Management and Coordination:** of the reform usually vested in a single Ministry in central government (the exceptions are LSRP and NACSAP which managed, respectively, through line Ministry, MoCAJ, and a statutory authority, PCCB).
- **Management and Technical Support:** Staff within the responsible Ministry dedicated full-time to coordinate the implementation of the reform, normally reporting directly to the PS
- **Implementation of the reform** through MDAs and LGAs (effectively the whole government), using existing government systems. In four of the reforms (NACSAP, PFMRP, LGRP and PSRP), virtually all MDA and LGAs are included. There are 17 institutions under LSRP and 6 MDAs are under BEST.

Several of the above structures have run into implementation challenges, many of which have been exacerbated by the mainstreaming process. The government has recognised many of these challenges and is addressing them through the following.

- **Limited high-level government ownership and leadership:** particularly demonstrated through Steering Committees on several reforms not meeting as frequently as required to direct programmes. This also creates perceptions that the reform is not being championed by the government's most senior officials. When the reforms expect large number of MDAs and LGAs to make significant and difficult changes, such champions are needed. On LSRP, the lack of such meetings was recently described as having created a "leadership void."³ The decision to dedicate one IMTC meeting every quarter to the core reforms provides a means through which the Chief Secretary can hold PSs accountable for their leadership. The important role of the IMTC to ensure coordination of all reform programmes and the responsibilities of the RCU to support the Chief Secretary to ensure this is also recognised in the strategy document for LGRP-II and PSRP-II.

³ LSRP Mid-Term Review, PwC (November 2009)

- **Management and Coordination:** The responsibility for this is clearer for reform programmes that are led by central Ministries, which have vertical relationship to MDAs and LGAs with the government structure. On NACSAP, interviews suggested the coordination role is sometimes confused between the PCCB and the GGCU. The PCCB is responsible for management and coordination of NACSAP. As a statutory authority, the PCCB sits adjacent to the government structure while the GGCU, based in the President's Office is in vertical relationship to the implementing institutions. However, the GGCU only has responsibility and capacity for collating reports. On LSRP, MoCAJ needs to coordinate 17 institutions, most of which it is in a horizontal relationship with.
- **Management and Technical Support:** This has emerged as a critical issue on all reforms. As implementation responsibility has been transferred to government, it has become apparent that government structures are not always functioning well and have often required significantly more support than anticipated. Moreover, though the intention is for the reforms to use existing government systems, such as strategic planning and budgeting, many still have their specific additional requirement. As identified in several interviews, support has been particularly required for core management tasks such as work-planning, budgeting and reporting which has been a bottleneck on several reforms.

On the first programmes to be mainstreamed, LSRP and PFMRP, it became apparent that the Programme Coordination Office (on the former) and the Secretariat (on the latter) did not have enough human resources with the right technical skills to effectively perform management and technical support functions. It was also apparent that the coordination entities did not have sufficient authority within the Ministry to hold implementing institutions to account. Both reforms are in the process of addressing their capacity issues and are significantly increasing their number of staff—LSRP is recruiting seven TAs and PFMRP has just recruited a Programme Manager and Programme Coordinator among a number of additional staff. To increase vertical lines of accountability, the LSRP PCO is now reporting directly to the PS and a new position of DPS Reform has been created as a full-time to implement PFMRP.

On the two most recent programmes to be mainstreamed, BEST and LGRP, the PMO and the PMO-RALG have, respectively, been significantly restructured to perform new functions. In the case of BEST, a new department has established the Investment and Private Sector Development Department (PSDID) in the PMO whereas as the PMO-RALG is recruiting a large TA team to support them implement probably the most ambitious of the reforms. The issue of human resources is complicated by the

In addition to the issue of capacity, the slow pace of mainstreaming generally suggest that a strong culture of reform implementation through parallel units had become and entrenched and is taking time to erode. It is not surprising that performance has slowed while the programmes have been focused on mainstreaming.

- **Implementation of the Reform:** Many of the Programme Coordinators interviewed identified capacity and ownership at the implementation level in MDAs/LGAs as a challenge. The capacity issue is often more in terms of numbers of personnel than technical capacity. The ownership issues relate to the challenges of communication, accountability and responsibility at the MDA/LGA level. The reforms have endeavoured to build ownership and accountability through: the appointment of Business Unit Managers as

“Change Managers” on PFMRP; the creation of “Link Officers” on LSRP; Integrity Committees on NACSAP; and Directors of Policy and Planning in MDAs and LGAs on LGRP. PSRP is the most advanced, giving MDA’s responsibility for developing their own customised public sector reform interventions (demand-led activities) to be supported by PO-PSM. However, in the first year of implementation, PSRP implementation slowed partly because MDA demand for reform was less than anticipated.

The conclusion is that reform institutional arrangements are sound as they: are aligned with vertical accountability structures of government; embed ownership of the reforms in the relevant PS reporting to the CS; include reform decision-making mechanisms for involving leaders across government; recognise the need for the reforms to be supported by staff dedicated to the reforms; endeavour to apply existing government systems to implement the reforms; and have mechanisms in place for building ownership and accountability at the implementation level. The challenge is in making these structures work. Part of this challenge is that in some cases the PIU culture of parallel systems has taken some time to wear away. But also there have been problems with implementation: high-level decision making mechanisms have not been meeting as planned; the reforms have not had the enough, skilled staff dedicated to facilitate the reforms; and existing government systems have not always been functioning well or have not always been appropriate to the requirements of the reform.

3.2 Design and Practice of Reforms Implementation and Bottlenecks

In assessing the design of the reforms, this section focuses on the outcomes (or goals) that each reform is pursuing and the means for pursuing them. Key questions are: what changes are being pursued? How are these changes expected to be achieved? In response to these questions, most interviewees were in agreement that the reforms were ‘not business as usual’, although there were different ideas about the extent of change anticipated—for instance, whether the change was to be transactional or transformational. These different types of change have ramifications for whether the pace of implementation is viewed as satisfactory or not by different stakeholders, particularly when the M&E systems are not providing information required for more objective assessments (see Section 3.4). Additionally, it has implications for how implementers in the MDAs integrate reform activities alongside their routine activities.

The analysis of the reform programme designs mainly uses information from the reform strategy documents, complemented by interviewees’ comments. The analysis is based on a ‘theory of change’ (TOC) approach, mentioned in Section 2. The analysis of reform practice and bottlenecks is based more on interviews and reform reports, such as independent review and the GBS assessment.

3.2.1 Enhanced National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan

3.2.1.1 Design

The description of the type of change that NACSAP is trying to achieve is unclear. However, the purpose contained in the strategy of “strengthening the mechanisms and processes for the prevention and combating of corruption in Tanzania” suggests a focus on incremental changes to develop systems and procedures that were established in Phase I. The strategy identifies a

range of broad benefits expected to accrue from NACSAP which can be summarised as (a) better monitoring of corruption (b) better capacity of anti-corruption agencies and (c) reduction of corruption. To trigger these benefits, the strategy is relying on the implementation of processes such as (a) governance and corruption surveys and Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS); (b) establishing and training “Integrity Committees” in all MDAs and LGAs; (c) networks and forum with the private sector, CSOs, Parliament and other oversight bodies; (d) and capacity development of the PCCB, GGCU and Director of Public Prosecutions.

However, the strategy document does not articulate what the causal links are between the processes to be supported and the expected benefits. No assumptions or problem analysis is provided. The main assumption appears to be that the following combination of factors will, taken together, trigger a decrease in corruption: making public servants and the public aware of corruption, putting in place mechanisms by which corruption can be monitored and reported, and strengthening the capacity of enforcement agencies. These assumptions may be correct but how do you know the public is aware, that there are incentive to report corruption etc? This requires an analysis of the broader, complex combination of social, political, cultural and economic factors that might be driving corruption. The DG of the PCCB recognised the scale of the issue trying to be addressed describing anti-corruption efforts as requiring nothing short of “a major change in the attitudes and behaviours of people across society.”

3.2.1.2 Practice

The broad focus of NACSAP makes it difficult to determine progress because it is unclear what the strategy is trying to achieve. This is compounded by a quarterly reporting practice which, in the absence of a functioning M&E system, is focussed at an activity level. It is instructive to note that the clearest description the Study Team could find of the work of NACSAP was in the GBS Annual Reviews, although again it was unclear whether all of the interventions fell under NACSAP or anti-corruption efforts more broadly.

Some of main results attributed to NACSAP are the enactment of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act, 2007; the Money Laundering Act; launching of the National Governance and Corruption Survey; passing of law separating the office of the Director of Public Prosecution Services from the police in 2008; establishment of the Financial Intelligence Unit; more than 20 cases of grand corruption prosecuted; an enormous amount of training and awareness-raising of Integrity Committees in MDAs and LGAs, CSO, schools etc; creating National Anti-corruption forum involving NSAs; and supporting investigative journalism into corruption cases. It is unclear whether all of the above activities can be attributed to NACSAP or whether they are the routine work of some of the agencies, especially the PCCB.

3.2.1.3 Implementation Issues

The main implementation issues identified are the poor quality of quarterly reports, lack of M&E information and the need for capacity development of key oversight institutions (PCCB, DPP, Ethics Secretariat etc). The DPs have identified a number of areas where the anti-corruption framework could be strengthened by updating existing legislation such as the 1995 Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act, the Political Parties Financing Act and Right to Information Act

3.2.2 Public Financial Management Reform Programme Phase III

3.2.2.1 Design

The PFMRP-III has adopted a clear, international recognised approach for achieving change in PFM. The 'platform approach' defines steps to be followed in logical sequence to achieve an effective, low risk, incremental change in PFM. First, reforms focus on developing capacity to maintain aggregate fiscal discipline; then, they concentrate on the efficient allocation of resources to government priorities; and last the priority is on the efficient delivery of services. The strategy documents suggests that while sufficient progress was made on fiscal discipline in Phase I, progress on developing the efficient allocation of resources in Phase II stalled and this remains the main focus of Phase III while also beginning to prepare for the last step.

The analysis of the problems faced in Phase II informs the design of the third phase. The analysis in the strategy was that lack of programme management and coordination; challenges in mainstreaming, the continuation of parallel systems and limited ownership at the implementation level were key factors. In the second phase of the reform, a number of disparate projects, based in different department of MoFEA with different funding sources were brought together into a single programme and aligned with government structures (MTEF, SPBRF); though funding sources may have remained separate. The assumption was that the development of a single programme would build ownership among implementers and help to realise the synergies between different activities. However, the experience on Phase II was that the different departments did not develop a shared vision of the reform programme and the specific role that they might be playing in achieving it. Rather PFMRP-II was seen as a source of financing for activities that could be considered part of PFM.

The recent Independent Review (November 2009) suggests that problems in the second phase may not have all been addressed in the Phase III. The Strategic Plan for Phase III is critiqued for increasing the scope of the preceding phase and not enabling the programme to be 'focussed, prioritised and manageable' (page 9). Problems in the design include: an unclear component structure (10 components are listed in the Strategic Plan but the 08/09 Annual Report mentions 14); the undefined linkages between components and outputs; large number of outputs (22) not prioritised; some activities that do not relate to outputs; output indicators that often do not relate to improvements in performance but rather the completion of activities; and a goal and purpose at such a high level that they cover all PFM activities, helping to reinforce the perception existing in Phase II that PFMRP is a source of financing for any activities that a part of PFM.

3.2.2.2 Practice

The achievements of the reform for the 2008/09 financial year were assessed by the Independent Review as being well-short of expectations, although a definitive statement was made difficult because of the problems in the Strategic Plan outlined above as well as a lack of indicators and time-frames. A further reflection of the slow progress was that only 59% of the funding was released.

In the 2008/09 GBS Review, PFMRP outcomes were described as largely unchanged from the preceding year but with some improvements such as: the production of government accounts in

IPSAS format; introduction of economic classification; strengthening of internal audit, external audit and procurement; and evidence of high-level political commitment.

3.2.2.3 Implementation Issues

Several explanations are offered for the slow pace of implementation. These include: a) delays in funding being made available; b) inappropriate sequencing of activities (eg training provide without conducting a training needs analysis); c) a tendency to focus on activities inappropriate to the needs of the programme such as training because of the financial benefits that go to participants; d) limited monitoring of the effectiveness of training and other capacity building strategies; e) activities being undertaken that are not directly linked to outputs; f) unrealistic and ambitious reform scope; and g) ineffective management of the reform.

The ineffective management of the programme is a significant bottleneck; however, this is not necessarily a reflection of poor institutional arrangements. As mentioned in Section 3.1, the issue is that the arrangements have not been tested because they have lacked human resource. With the recruitment of the Programme Manager and the Programme Coordinator at the end of 2009, the Secretariat responsible for the reform has only just been created. Without the Secretariat in place, the Component Managers responsible for implementation have struggled with reporting requirements. In the absence of adequate reporting DPs have become more involved in detailed management which, as was clearly evident in interviews, was a cause of tension in the relationship with government. Lack of performance has led to major parts of the basket funds being withheld, while activities funded through projects have performed better and enjoyed more predictable. These funding problems have compounded the issues in the relationship between DPs and government. The Independent Review defined the relationship as characterised by confrontation and cynicism. In interviews, some DPs were talking about whether the Programme should be broken up into projects whereas government discussed how DPs direct engagement with Component Managers was serving to undermine government leadership and authority.

3.2.3 Legal Sector Reform Programme

3.2.3.1 Design

The Medium Term Strategy for LSRP contains a clear vision for the Legal Sector in Tanzania—‘Timely Justice for All’—but does not contain a strong description of the type of change this vision entails or how the change might be achieved. The document mentions that the Programme will take a sector-wide approach as the delivery of justice requires legal sector institutions to work in tandem with safety and security agencies (i.e. the police and the prisons) as well central ministries, local government etc. Management arrangements are put in place to cut across the 17 MDAs (as well as NSAs) that are implementing the programme but minimal consideration is given to how to change the modus operandi of the institutions to enable them to work together to reform the Sector. Rather, the emphasis is on the opposite—embedding or ‘mainstreaming’ the programme into existing administrative structures.

The MTS then is less a strategy for reform and more a strategy for the development of systems, provision of training and updating of laws. The programme key result areas include: ‘updating and harmonising’ the legal framework; ‘improving and enhancing’ access to justice; ‘strengthening and enhancing’ agencies protecting human rights; ‘developing’ the skills and knowledge of legal professionals; and ‘enhancing’ the management capacity of legal sector institutions. The implicit vision contained in the MTS is of incremental technical change through the provision of additional financial resources, more/better infrastructure, enhancement of existing systems and development of new ones, and the provision of training.

3.2.3.2 Practice

Long delays have characterised the implementation of LSRP. Many of the blockages have been in technical and managerial areas such as work-planning, procurement and budgeting. Not surprisingly, neither government stakeholders nor DPs were talking in interviews about how to realise significant change to the legal sector in Tanzania (which as described above is not part of the design). Rather, they were talking about how technical and managerial issues were being addressed to enable activities to start moving so that the sector could start functioning better not necessarily differently. Given the scale of the challenges to achieving justice for all in Tanzania, achievement of this objective could potentially make a significant difference.

The recent Mid-Term Review (October 2009) found that of the 81 outputs contained in the MTS, only 6% were completed and satisfactory progress had been achieved for only another 15%. However for the remaining 79% of outputs the assessment was that no ‘complete or intermediate outputs’ had been achieved. Similarly, of the six KRAs, only two were assessed as having made satisfactory progress (KRA 1-National Legal Framework and KRA 4-Knowledge and skills of legal professionals). The Review Report assesses implementation since the launch of the MTS in 2006 as a *qualified* ‘unsatisfactory’. The qualification is that the Programme has effectively only had funds for about 12 months over the full period (two months in FY 2007/08 and six months in FY 2008/09). If the performance of the Programme is assessed against these 12 months, then the Review Report concludes that a case can be made for a ‘satisfactory’ rating. The findings of the Review Report have been accepted by the Government and DPs and are the most recent comprehensive assessment of LSRP progress.

For the last financial year, Government and DPs agreed that the pace of implementation had improved and both gave LSRP a satisfactory rating in the 2009 PAF, the first such rating in the last three years. Though heading in the right direction, progress was recognised as uneven. Progress in some institutions such as DPP, Police, Law School and Prisons have been satisfactory but in other institutions like BRELA, CLE, UDSM and AGC the pace remains too slow.

3.2.3.3 Implementation Issues

Government and DPs seem to be in broad consensus on the challenges and recent successes of LSRP implementation. The key issues have been: lack of leadership and ownership; limited capacity of the Programme Coordination Office and the Sector Institutions particularly in work-planning, reporting and procurement;

Despite some signs of improvement, work-planning (and reporting) remains a major bottleneck in the implementation of LSRP. The process has been described as lengthy and burdensome and the main source of frustration and tension between government and DPs. In the past, the process has commenced in April (for the financial year from July-June) with Sector Institutions being provided with budget ceilings by the PCO and being asked to develop annual work-plans, budgets and procurement plans in line with the MTS. The PCO then compiles work-plans from the institutions and submits to the Development Partners for review and approval. Invariably, the DPs have expressed concern at the quality and content of the plans and requested substantial revisions before they will release funds. Sometimes the process has been repeated a couple of times. The result is that funds have not finally been released until very late in the financial year with little time for implementation before the planning process for the following year commences.

The problems in the planning and reporting process expose deeper problems in the implementation of LSRP which can be linked back to the concepts of reform and mainstreaming in the original design. These problems have been identified and are being slowly addressed.

- First is the weak capacity of the institutions to complete plans and reports combined with the limited capacity of the PCO to support them through this process. This issue partly reflects the mainstreaming approach in which existing structures were assumed to be fit for the purpose of the reform programme without additional support. The implementation experience exposed capacity gaps which are now being filled by significantly increasing the capacity of the PCO through the engagement of seven long-term technical advisers. One of the first gaps to be addressed has been in M&E. For most of the Programme no M&E system has been functioning. With TA support, an M&E Plan was developed at the end of 2009.
- A second problem was that the LSRP planning process had become divorced from the government planning cycle contrary to the mainstreaming intention in the design and serving to reinforce a perception in the Institutions that the Programme was distinct from the operations of the MDAs. Following recommendations from the recent review, planning for FY 2010/11 has now commenced before the MTEF process. In February 2010, Government and DPs held a forum to determine MTS priorities and budget ceilings which will be later incorporated into the subsequent MTEF process.
- A third problem was tension between government and DPs over the quality and content of the work-plans. A particular concern for DPs was the increasing amount of funding directed towards infrastructure and training. Partly this reflects different expectations over the meaning of reform, with the institutions seeing the programme as a means for obtaining resources for activities they currently cannot afford to do; in comparison with the expectations of DPs that activities are for changing the way the Sector currently operates. Stronger guidance to the institutions in the development of their work-plans (by a strengthened PCO) and involvement of DPs in the pre-MTEF process described above may help to create a common understanding about the kinds of activities to be funded under the MTS. Ultimately, this guidance needs to come from the leaders of the Sector.

The leadership, ownership and political will of the reform have been questioned by various stakeholders. In the words of the Review Report, the LSRP has suffered from a 'leadership

void'. The lack of meetings of the Programme's high level decision-making bodies (Steering Committee, JPIRC, and TTC) has been sighted as a primary example. However, this situation has improved in the last year during which meetings of the JPIRC, chaired by the Chief Justice, and the TTC took place according to schedule (biannually for the former, quarterly for the latter). Development Partners also see the Government's recent policy decision to separate the Attorney General's Chambers from MoCAJ as a sign of political commitment to the Programme. They also comment positively on the impact of the new PS of MoCAJ, appointed at the beginning of 2009. They suggest LSRP is benefiting from his understanding of sector-wide approaches (from recent experience in the Ministry of Education) and that he has already brought an increased level of government interest, ownership and leadership. However, a critical constraint remains the limited buy-in of the Judiciary who are the natural leaders of the Sector.

3.2.4 Local Government Reform Programme

3.2.4.1 Design

The LGRP-II *Vision, Goals and Strategy July 2009-June 2014* (September 2009) contains a clear vision of the change that is being pursued and the strategy for achieving this change. The changed is encapsulated in the programme purpose: "To achieve devolution of Government role and functions, and to that end transform LGAs to be competent strategic leaders and coordinators of socio-economic development, accountable and transparent service delivery and poverty reduction interventions in their areas of jurisdiction." The document acknowledges that this is an ambitious undertaking which will transform the operations of the whole of the government but it 'may not be achieved in the next five years of the programme'. The strategy for achieving this change is presented in the four Programme components. One is to give LGAs the powers and resources they need by removing the blockages in Central and Sector Ministries to the implementation of the governments D by D policy. Two is to develop the capacity of the LGAs so that they can deliver on their new responsibilities. Three is to promote citizens demand for LGAs to be transparent and accountable in the delivery of services. Four is to use existing government systems to manage the implementation of these reforms through a mainstreamed programme management approach.

Unlike other reform designs (eg LSRP), LGRP-II gives substantial consideration to how to mainstream the programme. Presumably the emphasis is because a stand-alone Programme Implementation Unit was used for ten years in implementing the previous phase (although this explanation is not provided in the document). The key elements of the mainstreaming process includes: integrating responsibility for implementation into existing institutional structures, with the Chief Secretary and the IMTC being made ultimately accountable (as described above); integrating planning into the governments planning and budgeting cycle; and developing a comprehensive capacity development strategy.

The need for capacity development recognises that the relevant government structures do not currently have the capacity to implement Phase II, particularly the PMO-RALG and LGAs. Capacity is lacking both in terms of numbers of staff and technical expertise. A capacity assessment completed in 2008 found that PMO-RALG was operating with only 156 of the 272 positions in their establishment. However, even with these positions filled, external technical

expertise is needed to support implementation. The LGRP-II capacity development approach involves filling the established government positions; engaging a large team of long-term, international and national TA (in core governance areas of finance, human resources, M&E etc.); and then phasing implementation so that the level of activity increases as the capacity of PMO-RALG grows.

3.2.4.2 Practice

Since the completion of Phase I in June 2008, progress in transition to Phase II has been slower than anticipated. The transitional phase was intended to take six months but is still ongoing after 18 months. In the 2009 GBS Review, the performance of LGRP was rated unsatisfactory by the DPs but satisfactory by Government. One of the main reasons for the DPs rating was what was considered to be the limited progress in building the capacity and management of PMO-RALG to take over responsibility for implementation of the Programme.

3.2.4.3 Implementation Issues

The mainstreaming of LGRP into PMO-RALG is well advanced. A number of recent achievements include: the continued successful implementation of the successful Local Government Development Grant, with windows opening in agriculture, water, health and education; the development and agreement of an MOU between DPs and Government for the implementation of Phase II; development of financial management systems. Some of the implementation challenges include

- Poor quality and/or lack of work-planning and reporting
- Slow progress in implementation of agreed action plans
- A sense that Central Ministries were deviating from D by D suggesting that this Policy is still not well-understood and accepted by government.
- Inadequate progress by the Regional Secretariats in taking responsibilities of the former Zonal Reform Teams.
- Delay in recruitment of TA team – leading to reduce reform momentum.
- Delays in designing and agree the M&E Framework.
- Government introduced the Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund as an additional funding source to LGAs at a time when there are already some 30 different funding sources which are meant to be harmonise to three or four.
- While LGAs have a strong sense of upward accountability (eg. in 2002 60% of LGAs returned adverse audit findings; but by 2009 no LGAs had adverse findings), they have limited sense of downward accountability to citizens.

3.2.5 Public Sector Reform Programme Phase II

3.2.5.1 Design

The PSRP Medium Term Strategy is clear about the types of change that it is seeking to realise and also identifies some of the key assumptions upon which the reform is based. The second phase is seeking to continue the ‘long term transformation of the public service’ on the basis of:

- The momentum for reform created in Phase 1. Phase 1 is described as creating a will among citizens and public servants to continue the reform process and improve service delivery.
- The goals of PSRP being instrumental to the government’s poverty reduction and economic growth efforts, as expressed in Vision 2025 and MKUKUTA
- The political priority of the Fourth Phase Government of President Jakaya Kikwete to improve the public sector in terms of the quality and speed of service delivery and level of accountability and responsiveness.
- The goals of PSRP reflecting international trends in which governments are: (a) being expected to be accountable for results and to report those results to citizens (b) benefiting from developments in ICT which are improving the efficiency of how governments perform their internal operations, deliver services to citizens and provide information to the public.

The critical factor for the success of Phase II is to embed ownership of the reforms at the MDA level and then build their capacity to implement the reforms. The measures for achieving this are twofold. One is to make MDAs responsible for assessing their capacity needs and designing their own capacity development strategies, with the support of PO-PSM who act as management consultants/advisers and provide a menu of strategies to guide MDAs. The other is to ensure PSRP related reform activities as well as those of other cross-cutting reforms are integrated into, and coordinated through, each MDA’s strategies. Capacity in monitoring evaluation is highlighted as critical part of MDA’s strategy development. While PSRP is being implemented through a mixture of supply and demand driven strategies, the intention is that MDAs will make the decisions on the types of reform interventions they need and want.

Most of the KRAs relate to further developing systems and procedures and institutionalising them at the MDA level. The focus is on supporting MDAs to apply these systems, particularly through training and other capacity development strategies. The assumption here is that “a better and more systematically managed institution will provide improved services to its clients” (p.22). Two KRAs which are different are KRA 3: Pay, Incentives and Rewards and KRA 4: Accountability and Responsiveness. The assumption of the former is that a better pay policy will provide the incentives needed to create a motivated, disciplined and ethical public service. For the latter, strengthened lines of accountability both within government (horizontally, on the supply side, between bodies) and between government and citizens (vertically, on the demand side) are seen as necessary to reinforce and support improvements to services. In Phase I, information was made available to the public but this was not seen as enough to trigger demand. In Phase II, emphasis is to be placed on the creation of mechanisms to encourage the public to provide feedback to the government. The PSRP strategy document emphasises the strong political commitment of the Fourth Phase Government as key for achieving KRAs 3 and 4.

3.2.5.2 Practice

In interviews, government reform leaders described PSRP-II as trying to achieve a transformational change which most people in the public service did not want. Two elements of this transformation were highlighted. The first was the introduction of a performance-oriented culture. The second was to make the public service accountable and responsive to the public. One interviewee said the reforms will have been successfully achieved when “citizens are happy with services being delivered by the public service”. This engagement with citizens is being progressed through client service charters, complaints procedures and initiatives to work with non-government organisations. NGOs were described as adding value because they deal with society at different levels to the public service. Past education campaigns by Hakielimu were offered as an example of the constructive role that NGOs could play by building public support for reforms that the public service was already pursuing.

The main report available on the implementation of PSRP II since it commenced at the beginning of 2008 is the *Annual Report: July 2008 to June 2009* (September 2009). This report shows that some 84% of activities for that financial year had been completed (58%) or were underway (26%) (total activities = 243). Moreover, most of the budget for that year had been executed as planned, with MDAs spending 89.6% of their budget for demand-led activities (TSH11.29 billion) and PO-PSM spending 92.1% (TSH13.1 billion). This relatively high level of activity has not translated into completion of milestones. Out of the 20 milestones to be delivered, three were met as planned, four were partially met, 12 were delayed and one was off-track. The Annual Report provides information against only some of the 84 output indicators presented in the PSRP Results Framework. The Study Team understands that information against all indicators will be collected for future reports.

With key pieces of information omitted from the Annual Report, it is difficult to assess if the implementation of the reform is taking place on schedule. In the 2009 PAF, government and DPs agreed that the performance of PSRP had been satisfactory.

3.2.5.3 Implementation Issues

Despite the impression suggested by the Annual Report, stakeholders suggested that the pace of implementation over the last two years was slower than had been the case under Phase I. One explanation offered is that the objective in Phase Two is more challenging than that in Phase One as it involves changing attitudes and behaviours of public servants to use new management systems and procedures—the introduction of a performance culture is acknowledged as an ambitious and long-term objective for the Tanzanian government. A bottleneck identified by Government stakeholders is that public servants are currently not being held accountable for poor performance. In Phase II, institutionalising the use of internal accountability mechanisms, such as OPRA, is supported through the PSRP’s demand driven approach.

The new demand driven approach introduced in the second phase is another explanation given for the slower pace of implementation. While stakeholders expected implementation to be slow at the start while MDAs were learning the new approach (including learning how to access funds from the basket etc), the pace of implementation was lower than anticipated. Notably, this perception does not seem to be supported by the Annual Report which shows that in the 25 MDAs where demand activities had commenced, spending projections for these activities had been largely met. The Annual Report does identify problems with the quality of the monitoring

reports the MDAs have been preparing on these activities. PO-PSM is developing a new monitoring framework to address this problem.

More broadly, M&E was identified as a continuing weakness in the implementation of PSRP. Government interviewees said that few people in the MDAs were getting involved in M&E or understood the ‘results chain’. A possible explanation offered was that M&E systems had often been introduced to MDAs as computer-based systems resulting in M&E coming to be seen as an area for technical specialists rather than all managers. The monitoring of both supply and demand activities is a key role for PO-PSM and the general weakness in these areas is likely to place extra pressure on this office adding to a workload already increased by the decision early in the life of Phase II to roll out PSRP reforms beyond 67 MDAs to encompass some 90 MDAs.

3.2.6 Business Environment Strengthening in Tanzania

3.2.6.1 Design

The DRAFT BEST strategy document (April 2008) describes the changes being pursued as ‘bold’ – better regulation means changing the way Government makes policy, the way it uses regulation as an instrument to implement policy, and the way it measures and accounts for its successes.

“Openness, transparency and accountability for the outcomes of policy and regulatory decision-making, is an extremely bold agenda for governments that are transitioning from a history of centrally planned economics. It is tempting for outsiders to assume that governments and stakeholders will assume reform is good for them, over-estimate the appetite and capacities for reform, and the quality of existing processes to support reform, and radically underestimate what it takes, particularly in the context of weak and often highly politicised policy management structures”. (p. 52)

Key features of the strategy to achieve this change include:

- Ensure that stakeholders understand the link between good regulation, business growth, wealth creation and improved living standards;
- Ensure that people understand government has a role to play in allowing the private sector to be the engine of growth ie. currently most people in government see the need to improve the business environment as outside their core business
- Address the perception that this benefits foreign investors instead of domestic business and it comes at the expense of social justice, the environment.
- Address the perception that poverty reduction means social protection of the most vulnerable, rather than as a primary target of investment climate strengthening.

The most significant risk to the achievement of the BEST objectives is lack of pressure from the private sector and civil society groups to hold Government accountable for high quality policy delivery.

The main beneficiaries are expected to be: (a) MSME who will have an improved investment climate; (b) 20 MDAs who will have improved capacity (a) government who will have wider tax base.

3.2.6.2 Practice

The design for Phase 2 recognises that the implementation in Phase I had been slower anticipated. The reason identified for this included: (a) overly ambitious goals, (b) lower than expected capacity both in the PIU and in the MDAs (c) lack of sequencing of activities, (d) confusion over institutional arrangements particularly the division of labour between the PIUs and MDAs (e) lack of ownership in the MDAs. The pace of implementation in Phase I began to improve when work-planning and procurement planning processes had been bedded down; MOU signed between MDAs and BRU confirming roles and responsibilities; appointment of a new CEO; stronger monitoring from DPs; and engagement of procurement professionals in the BRU.

To qualify for funding from DPs for Phase II, the government has agreed to meet criteria negotiated with the DPs in a 'Review Assessment Framework'. These criteria relate to (a) planning, (b) institutional arrangements, (c) results and (d) reporting. Progress against these criteria is being assessed by an Implementation Support Mission every six months.⁴ The most recent mission in November 2009 concluded that the progress of BEST activities remained "marginally unsatisfactory." The Mission found that over the preceding six months, less than 10% of agreed benchmarks had been achieved.

3.2.6.3 Implementation Issues

The explanation offered by the ISM for the limited achievement of agreed benchmarks was that the government had spent most of the time trying to achieve mainstreaming objectives and had neglected implementation. The ISM documents a series of bottlenecks

- Unrealistic workplans not completed in timely fashion leading to delays in implementation or activities not being implemented at all. Confusion between MTEF and BEST work plans – so still are not aligned in some cases.
- Delayed disbursement from treasury also leading to delays in implementation. The Business Registration Reform Component only spent 19% of its budget for the 2008/09 year.
- Meetings of the TRC are also pushed back because of the above delays.

⁴ Consisting of representatives from GoT, Danida, DFID, SIDA, CIDA, EKN and the World Bank.

- High level leadership is being shown by the PO-PSM who is holding BEST coordinators and implementers more accountability; the President through his call for the development of a “Doing Business Roadmap”, the Chief Secretary is showing an active interest.
- Best is not reporting through MTEF as planned. This reduces accountability as there are no reports on (a) whether activities are being delivered on time (b) within budget (c) that they are fit for purpose.
- Communication to the public is non-existent – MDAs have no communication strategy.
- Lack of clarity between MDAs and the PMO over responsibilities for implementing BEST.
- PS in some MDAs is not taking responsibility for implementation – even though Accounting Office in their institution has control of the financing.
- Incentives structures are not in place to encourage MDAs to own implementation and pursue results. There is still a danger that coordinators outside of the MDAs will have responsibility for implementing BEST. Training is not always provided to the right people who can have the most impact on the Programme. The use of allowances at various steps of the procurement process means there is no incentive for quick decisions.
- Mechanism for creating demand from the private sector remains weak.
- Procurement planning and execution is very slow. In 2008/09 only 4 out of 38 procurements planned under Business Registration Reform Component were completed.
- Need for and IEC strategy to involve “Reform Stakeholders” in the programme (ie. the private sector)

3.3 Effectiveness of reforms in facilitating MKUKUTA Objectives

The purpose of this section is to review if the institutional arrangements and design and practice of the reforms are in line with attainment of MKUKUTA objectives by looking at the effectiveness of these reforms in facilitating intended MKUKUTA Objectives and hence whether they are contributing to providing better governance. This section begins by looking at how strongly the objectives of the MKUKUTA Governance Cluster, as defined by the indicators in the MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan, are aligned with the reform programme objectives. A reverse analysis is conducted next, in which we start from the objectives of each the reform programmes and examine the extent to which these are aligned with MKUKUTA Governance Cluster objectives. The aim is to identify which of the Cluster II objectives align to the core reform programmes (and hence which ones do not) and in reverse which of the core reform programme objectives align with the cluster 3 objectives (and hence which ones do not). Last, we draw on the analysis in 3.1 and 3.2 above to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the core reforms in facilitating intended MKUKUTA objectives.

3.3.1 Alignment of MKUKUTA with Reform Objectives

The table presented in Annex C summarises how the MKUKUTA objectives, as contained in the MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan (MMMP), are aligned with the objectives of the reforms. This table is based on the MMMP document, the MKUKUTA Annual Implementation Report (MAIR) for 2008/09, and the *most current* Strategies and M&E Frameworks (where available) for each of the reforms. The premise of the MMMP was MKUKUTA objectives and indicators would be incorporated into reform documents and that information would be collected at the MDA level and reported back. The table in Annex C shows:

- 24 indicators were developed to measure performance towards 6 goals under Cluster III: Governance and Accountability (performance information was not developed for the seventh goal);
- There are many gaps in the information surrounding these indicators such as lack of baseline information, targets not determined and regular information on performance not collected. Of the 24 indicators up-to-date performance information has been collected for only 11 indicators.
- 60% of the indicators (14 out of 24) are linked with indicators and/or results that have been identified in the reforms.
- Current performance information has generally not been collected for reform related performance indicators (there is performance information for only two such indicators).
- The linkage between the reform-based indicators and those in the MKUKUTA is generally not strong (5 out of the 14 have a direct, strong linkage).
- MKUKUTA is not directly linked to the BEST programme. A summary of the linkages are:

MKUKUTA Outcome	Reform links
1. Structures and systems of governance as well as the rule of law are democratic, participatory, representative, accountable and inclusive.	PSRP = 15% LGRP = 30%
2. Equitable Allocation of public resources with corruption effectively addressed	PFMRP = 50% NASCAP = 30%
3. Effective public service framework in place to provide foundation for service delivery improvements and poverty reduction	PSRP = 100%
4. Rights of the poor and vulnerable groups are protected and promoted in the justice system	LSRP = 100%
5. Reduction of political and social exclusion and intolerance	LSRP = 100%
6. Improved personal and material security, reduced crime, eliminate sexual abuse and domestic violence	0%

Part of the reason for the strong alignment of LSRP to MKUKUTA Goals 4 and 5 is that the recently developed M&E Framework was explicitly designed to include the MKUKUTA indicators. Similarly the strategies of LGRP, PSRP and PFMRP have been designed since the MKUKUTA was developed to specifically include MKUKUTA indicators.

3.3.2 Alignment of Reform Objectives with MKUKUTA

In this section, the study looks at the results identified in each of the reforms (outcomes and outputs) to determine the extent to which these programmes are aligned with the MKUKUTA. Each of the reforms are briefly analysed below:

- **NACSAP:** the majority of NACSAP goals do not seem to be directly aligned with the MKUKUTA goals. Out of the eight broadly defined NACSAP goals, only one could be said to be potentially aligned to one of the MKUKUTA goals. While the linkages are not clearly articulated, part of NACSAP goal 8 (the capacity of DPP to deal with corruption is enhanced) would logically seem to link with one of the indicators under MKUKUTA Goal 2 (number of corruption cases investigated and prosecuted by the DPP, which is an indicator of: Equitable allocation of public resources with corruption effectively addressed).

- **PFMRP:** out of the 22 outputs which constitute this reform, the following three logically link with MKUKUTA Goal 2:

PFMRP Output 3: Improved predictability of resource availability to LGAs;

PFMRP Output 11: Improved procurement operations and procedures in MDAs & LGAs.

PFMRP Output 16: Improved capacity of MDAs and LGAs in budget performance monitoring, accountability and transparency.

PFMRP also tries to directly link one of the indicators at goal level to the MKUKUTA more broadly, setting a target for 10% of MDA and LGA budget allocations to be directed toward MKUKUTA priorities (although the basis for target set at 10% is unclear).

- **LSRP:** consists of six key result areas. Two LSRP KRAs match two MKUKUTA Goals:

LSRP KRA 2: Access to Justice for the poor and disadvantaged + MKUKUTA Goal 4: Rights of the poor and vulnerable groups are protected and promoted in the justice system

LSRP KRA: Human rights and Administrative Justice + MKUKUTA Goal 5: Reduction of political and social exclusion and intolerance.

The new, yet to be implemented, LSRP M&E framework has incorporated MKUKUTA performance indicators or is collecting information relevant to all of the indicators under these two goals.

- **LGRP** consists of four components, of which part of Component 3: “Enhanced citizen participation and accountability” aligns with part of MKUKUTA Goal 1: “Structures and systems of governance as well as the rule of law are democratic, participatory, representative, accountable and inclusive”. In particular, three (out of 12) of the outputs in Component 3 link with 2 (out of 7) of the indicators under MKUKUTA Goal 1. LGRP Components 1 and 2, which where most of the Programme’s energy and resources are targeted, do not directly link with the MKUKUTA indicators, although the MKUKUTA document recognizes the importance of local government service delivery to address

Tanzania’s poverty reduction and growth. There is a strong logical link between the overall goal of LGRP and the goals of the MKUKUTA.—“Accelerated and equitable socio-economic development, public service delivery, poverty reduction across the country.” (NB. The current draft LGRP M&E Framework does not include any of the MKUKUTA indicators).

- **PSRP** outcomes under KRA 4 and 5 are directly linked to MKUKUTA Goals 1 and 3. One of the indicators for MKUKUTA Goal 1 (percentage of women among civil servants) is also an indicator for PSRP outcome “Public Service Composition reflects the diverse character of the nation” (under PSRP KRA 5: Human Resource Management Services). There are two indicators under MKUKUTA Goal 3 (Effective public service framework in place to provide foundation for service delivery improvements and poverty reduction). The first of these indicators is the populations’ satisfaction with government service delivery. Similar indicators have been developed for PSRP at the Programme goal level. The second MKUKUTA Goal 3 is relevant to outcomes under KRA 4 related to accountability and responsiveness. The goal of PSRP is strongly logically linked to MKUKUTA—“MDAs deliver improved services (in terms of quality, timeliness and efficiency), implement relevant, priority policies, and establish a predictable and well regulated environment for private sector growth and social development.”
- **BEST** M&E framework was not available to the study team however; the phase 2 Programme logframe does not contain any results which directly link to Cluster III. The goal of BEST aligns broadly with MKUKUTA (“Employment generated and poverty reduced through enterprise growth and competitiveness particularly among SMEs, in Tanzania).

3.3.3 Summary of Effectiveness of Reforms in facilitating MKUKUTA Objectives

The gap in performance of the core reforms outlines in Section 3.2 suggests that they have had limited impact on MKUKUTA objectives under the Governance and Accountability Cluster. The overall progress on Cluster III is difficult to determine because—reflecting broader government weaknesses in M&E—the MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan has collected less than 50% of the performance information identified. Moreover, it is unclear precisely how the reforms were expected to contribute to Cluster III as the links were not clearly articulated. At a high level, the goals of all reforms broadly align with the goal of MKUKUTA to promote growth and reduce poverty. However, it is not possible to identify a clear results chain going from the reform outcomes and outputs to Cluster III goals. The indicators for the MKUKUTA goals sometimes link to reform outcomes but other times they link to lower level outputs. At the outcome/outputs levels there are linkages between five of the reforms and five (out of six) of the Cluster Three objectives. No links at the outcome/output levels could be found for the BEST Programme. Overall some 60% of the indicators set up to measure achievement of Cluster III objectives relate to outcomes and outputs in the reforms. Regardless of the lack of clear, causal links, the reforms have collected for only a minimal number of the indicators for which they were responsible (2 out of 14). On this basis the reforms could be assessed to have not been effective in facilitating MKUKUTA objectives.

3.4 Comparison of Reform Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks

This section examines the M&E frameworks in each of the core reforms in order to assess if results are well-identified and documented. Before beginning this analysis the current status of M&E Frameworks is described.

3.4.1 Overview of Reform M&E Frameworks

Reporting, monitoring and evaluating results are acknowledged as a systemic weakness throughout government. The reform programmes reflect this broader problem. As mentioned in Section 3.2, all the reform programmes have experienced problems in designing and implementing M&E frameworks and in several cases they are not yet operating. The current status is:

- NACSAP-II is currently finalising an M&E system to be managed by the NACSAP Implementation Unit in PCCB. The M&E system has been developed by an external TA, with funding from the UNDP.
- PFMRP-III is developing an M&E/MIS package⁵. However, the Strategic Plan (June 2008) contains a logframe with outputs and associated indicators and these were reported against in the first Annual Progress Report (FY 2008/09) with baseline information and three year targets also provided. The logical coherence of the output indicators and their contribution to outcomes is discussed in Section 3.4.1 below.
- LSRP developed an *M&E Framework* in 2009 which was approved in October of that year. A full-time M&E TA is due to be engaged shortly and the framework will be implemented in 2010.
- LGRP-II included an interim *LGRP II (D by D) M&E and Local Government Performance Assessment Results Framework* with the *Vision, Goals and Strategy* document (September 2009). This Framework is yet to be finalised and implemented, which, as a PAF indicator for 2009, was one of the reason the DPs gave LGRP an unsatisfactory rating. A full-time M&E TA is due to be engaged shortly. M&E was considered a weakness in Phase I as it focussed on inputs only.
- PSRP-II produced a comprehensive *Results Framework and M&E Strategy* at the same as their Medium Term Strategy (July 2007), which identified 81 output indicators. At the time of the first and most recent Annual Report for Phase II (July 2008 to June 2009), this M&E System was only partially operational with only some of the output indicators reported against. PO-PSM has had M&E support for several years engaging the services of a long-term TA.
- BEST completed an M&E Framework in September 2009, which is currently being operationalised.

⁵ See PFMRP Annual Progress Report (FY 2008/09)

3.4.2 Identification and Documentation of Results

The aim in this sub-section is two-fold. One is to examine the ‘results chain’ or ‘programme logic’ outlined in the above M&E frameworks and the other is to consider how well progress towards these results has been documented. In the case of the first part of the analysis, the focus is on four reform programmes only (PFMRP, LSRP, LGRP and PSRP) as the M&E Frameworks for BEST and NACSAP were not available to the Review Team. The second part of the analysis focuses on PFMRP and PSRP as these are the only two reform programmes currently reporting against the outputs and outcomes.

A challenge in assessing how effectively results are identified and documented is that different M&E terminology is used across the reform programmes. For the purposes of this study, the following terms and definitions have been used:

- Outcomes—define the changes that are desired, for example in the organisational behaviour of public service institutions.
- Outputs—are the ‘products’ or ‘services’ that are produced from a series of activities. Several outputs often contribute to an outcome.
- Programme logic—refers to the ‘if-then’ relationship between inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes. For example: *if X inputs are provided then X activities will be completed; if these activities are completed, then X output will be produced. If X outputs are produced then X outcome will result.*

In the documents reviewed the terms impact and goal are also used. These are long term outcomes. Results chains are a term used by several interviewees, this is the programme logic.

These definitions are broadly consistent with, although a simplified version of, those contained in the Government’s *Medium Strategic Planning and Budgeting Manual* (October 2007).

3.4.2.1 Public Financial Management Reform Programme Phase III

The PFMRP is currently reporting against results identified in the log-frame of the Strategic Plan. This contains 22 outputs for which 106 indicators have been developed. As noted in the recent Independent Review, this is a very large number of outputs which makes the Programme difficult to manage and unfocused. Some of the outputs are described in broad terms while others describe higher-level changes that could be considered outcomes (eg. Output 16: “Improved capacity of MDAs and LGAs in budget performance monitoring, accountability and transparency”). Each output has indicators which are mentioned in the PFMRP Annual Report 2008/09, often with baseline information and targets. However, the indicators often do not relate to the outputs or are pitched at an activity level; thus, results are not being clearly identified or reported against.

3.4.2.2 *Legal Sector Reform Programme*

The results being pursued by the LSRP are identified in their just approved M&E Framework, which is yet to be implemented and reported against. This framework consists of the outcomes from the original LSRP log-frame along with indicators. While the framework addresses a gap in the original log-frame, which did not include indicators at the outcome level, the omission of outputs means that part of the programme logic is missing. The strength of the framework is that it is simple and focussed. There are 21 outcomes, for which 30 indicators have been developed. The framework also integrates MKUKUTA indicators and makes reference to other relevant sources of information such as Afrabarometer. The indicators are developed in some detail and are generally SMART. The framework identifies responsibilities or collecting the information and baseline information and targets are also provided for many of the indicators. The development of the framework through a participatory process with relevant personnel from the MDAs is a further strength and lays the foundations for stronger ownership of the document.

The main weakness of the M&E Framework stems from whether the proposed indicators are the most appropriate measures for the outcomes. Part of the issue is that the outcomes are often pitched at a high level and described broadly. For example, KRA 5: Outcome 3, “Improved working environment” (ie. in key sector institutions) is to be measured by “% increase in quality service delivery in legal sector institutions.” This indicator is sufficient for an improved working environment but not necessary. Also, KRA 1: Outcome 1, “Improved legal environment for Enhanced Social Justice, Safety and Economic Development” is a long-term, high-level outcome. LSRP’s current Quarterly Reporting format is mainly based at an activity organised each outcome. The risk is that the M&E Framework will not provide information needed to build a picture of what is happening in “the middle” – that is, the intermediary outcome level.

3.4.2.3 *Local Government Reform Programme*

The interim *LGRP II (D by D) M&E and Local Government Performance Assessment Results Framework* is designed to monitor the implementation of the reform programme and also the broader D by D Policy. The M&E Framework is informed by both the LGRP-II log frame and Performance Assessment Framework but is focussed on addressing six key questions that have been identified in relation to implementing both. For the LGRP-II element of the M&E Framework, which is the focus of this study, six outcomes (reflecting the six key questions) are identified to be measured through 20 performance indicators⁶. The draft M&E Framework is currently focussed on monitoring, although provision has been made to undertake evaluations in the future. Baseline information is yet to be collected. In making the following comments, we emphasise that this framework is still draft.

The LGRP-II M&E Framework is described as encompassing the LGRP II log frame. The log frame outlines a programme logic consisting of components, sub-components, ‘strategic objectives’ and outputs. Outcomes are not clearly identified, although some of the ‘strategic initiatives’ and ‘sub-components’ might be considered outcomes. The logframe consists of 109 outputs which are generally well-articulated and contain clear linkages to sub-components. However, it is unclear whether LGRP will be reporting results against the logframe or only the

⁶ For the D by D Policy element of the M&E Framework, three aggregated LGRP-II performance indicators are applied, as well as an aggregated Local Government Development Grant assessment indicator and three new indicators focussed on the enabling environment.

M&E Framework. The links between the framework and the log frame are also not made explicit. The six framework outcomes are pitched at a high level which seems to align with some of the log-frame sub-component descriptions. Relationships between framework outcomes and log-frame outputs are difficult to track. Also because of the high level, broad description of outcomes, the clarity of change desired is reduced and part of the programme logic is omitted, that is, the middle intermediary outcomes.

The use of broad, high-level outcomes also affects the logic within the LGRP-II M&E Framework in relation to how the 20 performance indicators directly relate to outcomes. For example, D by D Outcome 2 is defined as “Human Resource Decentralisation.” This does not provide information on what change is desired; where the change is to take place; and who is responsible for it. From the narrative description of outcome 2, it would seem that the outcome is really “LGAs efficiently and effectively recruit and manage human resources by xx date.” This is more than just having the authority to recruit and manage human resources. Since the outcome, as worded currently, is unclear, it becomes difficult to fully determine the relevance and appropriateness of the indicators. The appropriateness of the first indicator (“% of LGA management and technical staff that were actually hired/fired by the LGA council”) is clearly part of the decentralisation process as it includes the devolution of hiring/firing authority to LGAs. However, the second indicator—“% LGA management and senior staff that are female”—does not seem to be a good indicator of whether human resource management has been decentralised. The third indicator—“% decrease in vacancy rate”—may, as described in the framework, be a more appropriate indication of LGA capacity to attract and retain staff. It also seems to assume that LGAs will be able to do this better than do the MDAs under the current centralised human resource management structures.

As mentioned above, the M&E Framework is yet to be implemented and early PMO-RALG progress reports on Phase II remain at an activity level. When implementation does commence, care will need to be taken to ensure that the framework does not unnecessarily over-burden institutions responsible for collecting data. This is because the framework is meant to be additional/complementary to existing monitoring systems at the LGA or central government level (such as PLANREP, EPICOR, LGMD and the annual LGDG Assessment process).

3.4.2.4 *Public Sector Reform Programme*

The PSRP results are clearly identified in *Results Framework and M&E Strategy*. This document consists of: a Goal Level Results Matrix providing 9 indicators at an impact level; an Outcomes Results Matrix with 33 outcomes measured through 60 indicators; and a list of 39 outputs to be measured through 80 indicators. Targets and baseline information is provided as appropriate. The Programme logic between goal, outcomes and outputs is clearly articulated. The Strategy includes plans for a range of evaluations. The Framework represents a rigorous, ambitious M&E Plan to match an ambitious reform programme. While some of the PSRP indicators might be integrated into MDA planning processes and information collected by them, the intention is to contract additional consultants to collect information for the indicators. The main question about the framework is whether it is too ambitious, given the generally low levels of M&E capacity in the government. The first Annual Report (2008/09) only contained information against some of the outputs indicators and did not really report at an outcome level, suggesting that PO-PSM might already be struggling to implement it.

3.4.3 Summary Analysis

There are no reform programmes which are currently identifying and documenting results at what could be considered an optimal level. Any assessment about the progress of reforms implementation (both positive and negative), therefore, has to be qualified by the fact that M&E information is inadequate. Both the government and DPs recognise this issue and over the last couple of years have placed high priority on the development and implementation of M&E frameworks. Three frameworks have been finalised, but only two are operational. Another three frameworks are about to be finalised (NACSAP, LGRP, BEST).

Of the four M&E Frameworks reviewed, there was only one framework that was based on strong programme logic, PSRP. The framework for PSRP is rigorous and comprehensive. The main risk will be whether the government has the capacity to implement it. The strength of the frameworks for LSRP and LGRP (Draft) is that they are simple and modest and so more likely to be implemented given the limited M&E capacity in government. They do not attempt to monitor the whole programme, only parts of it. Both frameworks are focussed at the outcome level only, where changes are intended to take place. The limitations of these frameworks is that linkages between outcomes and outputs are often unclear (outputs are not defined at all on LSRP); outcomes tend to be described broadly and at too a high-level; and some of the outcome indicators do not seem to relate to the outcomes and/or they are measuring activities and outputs. The PFRMP M&E Framework contains similar problems to LSRP and LGRP, although it is based at an output level and is tracking a much larger number of indicators.

The common risk to all M&E frameworks reviewed is that they will end up monitoring activities and outputs and not progress toward changes (ie. outcomes). Even the PSRP, which possesses a strong M&E Framework, only reported at an output level in their first annual progress report. The lack of monitoring at an intermediary outcome level has been identified as problem throughout the world and has been termed the ‘missing middle’ (Booth a Lucas, 2002). The criticism is that M&E systems tend to emphasis high-level outcomes and low-level activities but not how inputs are transformed into outcomes, which is what is of most interest to policy makers. In the context of MKUKUTA and MKUZA, Van Diesan, Mpemba and Mwisomba (2010) suggest that the lack of information at the middle level reflects the lack of a culture of policy-making based on evidence. Information at an activity level is easy to collect.

In interviews one Deputy PS suggested that the problem was that the ‘programme logic’ concept was not well understood in government and M&E was not considered a management tool. Moreover, he suggested that past attempts to roll out M&E systems with computer data-bases may have led to M&E being equated with information technology, therefore seen as requiring highly technical expertise. This perception may have been compounded by the recent introduction through PSRP of a new government planning, budgeting, M&E and reporting process. While basically sound, the planning and reporting process does seem unnecessarily complex and unlikely to demystify M&E for the new user (see *Medium Strategic Planning and Budgeting Manual*, October 2007).

Another factor potentially undermining government interest in M&E is the potentially competing demands by DPs for this information. The risk, which is acknowledged by DPs, is that their demand for M&E information will undermine government ownership and authority of the reforms. In interviews, government officials confirmed they also had a strong interest in M&E information and recognised its value as a management tool. One PS suggested that the

interest of DPs in this information was mainly for accountability purposes, that is, to provide evidence of under-performance. This response suggests more could be done to promote the learning dimension of M&E as well as its accountability element. Learning is a particularly important element of management when trying to promote ambitious, risky changes in complex operational environments.

3.5 Synergies and Conflicts across Core Reforms

The purpose of this section is to identify overlaps, conflicts, and synergies across the reforms and suggest appropriate actions for addressing them. The assumption in this section is that whether potential areas of overlap become areas of conflict or synergy depends on how effectively they are coordinated and managed. One PS interviewed suggested that to facilitate coordination it would be helpful to develop a ‘checker-board’ which illustrated areas of synergy and overlap across the reforms. The Review Team has attempted to develop a simple matrix or ‘checker-board’ which is presented in Annex D.

As the matrix shows the need for reforms to work closely together derive from: (a) specific technical areas, which require two or more reforms to collaborate; (b) technical issues that have ramifications across all reforms but are clearly led by one reform (eg. D by D) or (c) broader management issues which are common to all the reforms. The areas identified under (a) and (b) are already documented in the reform strategies as areas for collaboration but those under (c) are not. This section briefly examines each of these three areas before considering the role of RCU to facilitate coordination.

3.5.1 Collaboration between reform programmes on technical areas

Interviewees identified existing processes which have been in place to facilitate coordination between reforms around specific technical areas. There are areas which have been documented in reform strategies. No other areas were identified by interviewees as potential sources of conflict and synergy. The following areas were highlighted:

- LGRP and LSRP: engaging on making Tanzanian laws compliant with the Government’s D by D Policy (through the Legal Harmonisation Task Force).
- LGRP and PSRP: collaborating to achieve the decentralisation of human resource management and pay at the LGA level. While PSRP is decentralising human resource management functions to all MDAs and LGAs, it has been a particular at the LGA level where there is a critical lack of staff in many areas. As the allocation of resources follows the allocation of staff, this is a key why some districts in Tanzania are receiving less public services.
- LGRP and PFMRP: engaging on the issue of fiscal decentralisation
- BEST and LSRP: working together under the Commercial Dispute Resolution component of BEST.

3.5.2 Integrating Reforms across government

The objective of many of the core reforms is to embed new systems and processes across the MDAs. The risk is that MDAs could be over-burdened as the six different core reforms compete for their time. For example, the separate planning processes which have existed under LSRP created frustrations that this reform was creating additional work for the MDAs. The key is to ensure that reform activities are integrated into MDA planning and budgeting processes. Most of the reform strategies are endeavouring to operate in this way, including:

- LGRP: Institutionalising functions and systems related to the D by D Policy
- PSRP: Systems for Pay, Incentives, and Rewards
- PSRP: Decentralised Human Resource Management
- PSRP: Leadership Development
- PSRP Accountability to citizens
- PFMRP: Financial Management Systems
- PFMRP: Audit Functions
- NACSAP: Ethics and Integrity Committees

3.5.3 Common areas in the management of reforms

As described above, the government has slowly been implementing a common approach to the management of the reform programmes, with Programme Implementation Units being phased out and coordination being handed over to the responsible Ministry under a mainstreaming approach. The mainstreaming approach has brought more pay equity across the different entities now responsible for reform, reducing a source of resentment and low morale under the PIU approach. However, the Chief Secretary acknowledged that better paid contracted staff were still being used in some cases and this continued to be source of low morale.

Until the creation of the Reform Coordination Unit, a forum did not exist for the reforms to come together and swap experience over some of the central management challenges which they all the face. One such challenge was identified by the DPS of PO-PSM as each reform was trying to be introduced by a central agency using a supply-driven approach. There are also very practical management issues in which sharing experience would be beneficial, for example, the Review Team understands that recently it was agreed that PSRP had best reporting template and all reforms would follow it. Some of the core management areas for swapping this experience would be:

- Planning, Budgeting, Monitoring and Evaluation
- Change management and communication strategies

- Mainstreaming
- Implementation of capacity developments strategies
- Coordination

3.5.4 Reform Coordination

The need to systematically identify overlaps, synergies and conflicts was one of the rationales for the creation of the RCU. Placing the RCU in the President's Office, gives it an elevated position separate to the Ministries from which to oversight all reforms. This role for the RCU was strongly supported in interviews. It was noted that it was too early to determine if the creation of the RCU was having an impact, although most interviewees suggested that the signs were positive.

Processes for coordination between reforms on key technical issues have already been developed and are working to varying degrees. The RCU can support the Chief Secretary to put pressure on respective PSs through the IMTC to make sure these processes are productive. Similarly the RCU, through review of the work-plans of the reforms, can provide an assurance that MDAs are not being over-burdened by multiple demands being made of them by different reform programmes. However, perhaps one of the most useful roles for the RCU could be to promote synergies between the reforms on common management issues where there are recognised weaknesses.

3.6 Integration of Cross-Cutting Issues

The purpose of this section is to identify the cross-cutting issues in the core reforms and the extent to which they have been significantly integrated and addressed. The MKUKUTA defines cross-cutting issues as factors which cut across sectors that negatively impact on income and non-income poverty (p.15). Specific issues highlighted are: 'gender', 'HIV and AIDs', the 'environment' and 'vulnerable groups'.⁷ Vulnerable groups include 'young people and children, people living with disabilities, and the elderly'. The MKUKUTA does not provide clear guidance on how integration is expected to occur, although it does mention that these issues should be "mainstreamed" across MDA and LGAs.

For the purposes of this review, "significant integration" is taken to mean that the issues are incorporated into reform design, implementation and M&E. Integration is seen as equivalent to mainstreaming, which is the way in which the approach to these issues are often described in the reform documents. On this basis, the assessment is that none of the cross-cutting issues are being significantly integrated into the reform programmes. The matrix in Annex E presents the actions being taken by each of the reform programmes on the cross-cutting issues of gender, HIV, and vulnerable groups. The issue of environment is excluded as none of the reforms explicitly mention environmental issues. The matrix is based on reform strategies and M&E frameworks and the findings are presented below.

⁷ 'Governance' and 'unemployment' are also sometimes described in the MKUKUTA as cross-cutting issues.

3.6.1 Integration of Gender Issues

To assess the extent to which gender has been integrated into the reforms, this section will consider four key elements of a gender mainstreaming approach⁸: (1) collection of sex disaggregated data and gender analytical information; (2) activities promoting the involvement of women as well as men in decision-making; (3) development of activities, with budgets, that promote gender equality and are based on gender-specific information; (4) design of organisational strategies to develop the skills, knowledge and commitment of staff involved in management and implementation.

The issue of gender is not mentioned in two of the reform programmes (NACSAP and PFMRP). On the remaining four programmes (LSRP, PSRP, LGRP, BEST), gender equality is identified as an important issue and several interventions have been designed to promote it. However, none these approaches contain all the above four elements of a gender mainstreaming approach and so they could all be strengthened. Moreover, as implementation is yet to commence, the effectiveness of these approaches cannot be determined. Progress on each of the reforms thus far is summarised below:

- On LSRP, the lack of a gender focus in the MTS was critiqued in two independent reviews. As a result, the Programme is putting in place a number of interventions which will, if implemented, significantly improve the extent to which this issue is integrated. These include: collection of sex disaggregated data as a part of the LSRP M&E Framework; recruitment of a Gender Specialist to be based in the PCO with responsibility for developing MDA capacity in gender and other diversity issues and ensure these issues are mainstreamed into work-planning; and the integrated of gender into a number specific activities across all six KRAs identified in the Mid-Term Review.
- PSRP is responsible for supporting MDAs and LGAs to mainstream gender into their human resources management practices. While activities have been designed for this purpose—including, activities and targets to promote an increase in women taking on decision-making roles—there are not many activities to makes sure that the way in which the programme is managed and implemented is sensitive to gender. For example, the requirements for collection of sex disaggregated data in the M&E Framework are limited; there does not appear to be any specific activities to develop capacity in gender; and the number of gender specific activities is few. However, the Programme gender approach seem to rely on the completion of a study on how to mainstream ‘diversity’ issues into MDA/LGA human resource management, which is partly intended to ensure compliance with laws eliminating discrimination in the workplace by gender, disabilities, religion, ethnicity, age, race, multicultural background etc.
- Similar to PSRP, the LGRP strategy is assessed as partially integrating gender issues. Strengths include identification of the need to collect some sex disaggregated data and the inclusion of indicators for measuring the number of women appointed to decision-making roles in LGAs. The strategy also identifies the problem of ensuring women’s voices are heard during local government planning processes as key challenge. However no strategy is

⁸ These four elements are taken from: Derbyshire, Helen, DFID, 2002, Gender Manual: A Practical Guide for Development Policy Makers and Practitioners. The Government of Tanzania’s Women and Gender Development Policy (WGDP) (2000), highlights that gender needs to be mainstreamed into government policies. The 2005 National Strategy for Gender Development specifies how this will be achieved.

provided on how to address this or how to build capacity in gender mainstreaming (eg. there is no provision for a gender specialist). Rather the approach to addressing gender seems to rely on working with PSRP to support the implementation of the governments ‘diversity agenda.’

- In the preceding phase, BEST commissioned a report on mainstreaming gender into the programme. In the current phase, BEST programme has developed an output on the programme support for the equality of men and women to conduct business. The approach to gender includes the development of gender indicators and the sex desegregation of data by sex. The report also recommended the appointment of a senior official from the BRU to be responsible for implementing the recommendations of the report. The recent Implementation Support Mission Aide-Memoire (November 2009) described gender awareness and mainstreaming as largely non-existent in the BEST Programme components.

3.6.2 Integration of HIV/AIDs

The issue of HIV/AIDs receives significantly less attention in the reforms than gender. The issue follows that of gender in that it is not mentioned in NACSAP but recognised in the remaining five (PFMRP, LSRP, PSRP, LGRP, BEST). The main programme to address HIV/AIDs is PSRP, which is responsible for supporting MDAs and LGAs to incorporate responses to the issue as part of their human resource management practices. Under phase I, guidelines on the management of HIV/AIDs interventions in the work place were developed, based on the National HIV/AIDs policy and strategy, which provides the basis for ongoing support in phase II. PSRP also has performance targets focused for (a) HIV-AID infection rates reduced in the public service and (b) Percentage of public servants satisfied with their employer’s HIV-AIDs workplace interventions.

Reflecting the responsibility the PSRP has on this issue, HIV and AIDs is not seen as the responsibility of LGRP. The limit of LGRP’s approach is to ensure HIV/AIDs is mainstreamed into the human resource management practices of the programme in line with GoT Policy. The BEST Programme mentions their responsibility for supporting the HIV/AIDs Code of Conduct at the Workplace and also identifies activities to control the spread of the infection among SME operators. The BEST strategy mentions that other activities will be developed in phase II. The only mention of HIV/AIDs in LSRP is in relation to activities to review laws to make sure they are in compliance with HIV policies.

3.6.3 Integration of other Diversity Issues

The integration of other diversity issues receives the least attention in the reforms. As mentioned above, PSRP has responsibility for supporting the government’s diversity agenda to be integrated into the human resource management practices of all MDAs and LGAs, working with LGRP in relation to LGAs. This agenda covers some of the vulnerable groups which are mentioned in MKUKUTA, like people living with disabilities and the elderly. On LSRP, KRA 2 on access to justice includes activities to strengthen juvenile justice. The review of laws also includes consideration of issues relating to children and disabled people.

3.7 Equity in Service-delivery

The aim of this section is to assess if the core reform objectives are in line with the goal of attainment of equity in accessing service-delivery. Equity is one of the principles on which the design of the MKUKUTA was based:

The basic tenet is that growth is necessary but not sufficient for poverty reduction. To that effect, equity issues need to be taken on board as well. Tanzania needs fast but equitable growth, focusing on reducing inequalities, increasing employment and enhancing livelihood opportunities for the poor. Equitable growth will entail improving access to and use of productive assets by the poor, addressing geographic disparities and ensuring equal and universal access to public services. (p. 26)

In interviews, there was a general sense from government that not enough attention had been given to equity issues in the implementation of MKUKUTA and that Tanzania had become more unequal society. The summary of the core reforms presented below, however, shows that equity was clearly embedded in the goals of most of the reforms, particularly for PFMMP, LSRP, LGRP and PSRP:

- **NACSAP:** Equity issues are not explicitly included the goals of NACSAP, although could be assumed to be one of the principles on which the National Anticorruption Policy is based.
- **PFMRP:** Equity is incorporated into the goal of Phase III as follows: “Improvement in the efficiency, effectiveness of the allocation of resources to achieve more equitable and improved public service delivery”. However, only one of the 22 output descriptions mentions equity. Output 3, ‘Improved predictability of resource availability to LGAs’, includes a target of ‘equitable distribution of cash transfers to LGAs by 2010’. It appears the PFRMP has made an assumption that equity issues have been addressed in design of the modernised public financial management systems that are to be implemented under Phase III.
- **LSRP:** The issue of equity is a central part of the objectives of LSRP as reflected in the Vision statement: “Timely Justice for All” and the Mission Statement: “to achieve social justice, equality and rule of law through quality and accessible legal services.” Moreover, equity is centrally addressed at the KRA through: the focus on removing impediments to access to justice in the review of laws in KRA 1; the broader aim of promoting access to justice for the poor and disadvantage, which is description of KRA 2; and the focus on human rights in KRA 3, which is premised on notion of equity.
- **LGRP:** The goal of LGRP includes a clear focus on equity: “Accelerated and equitable socio-economic development, public service delivery and poverty reduction across the country.” In particular, one of the key issues that the design of LGRP is aiming to address is the disparities in the level of funding provided by the central government to different LGAs. These disparities are largely caused by the central government continuing to allocate sector recurrent grants on the basis of existing personnel rather than on service needs. This has created large disparities in the funding per capita going to different LGAs. Through activities on fiscal decentralisation and human resource decentralisation, LGRP is monitoring the reduction of disparities in funding and technical staff.

- **PSRP:** The PSRP goal is: “MDAs deliver improved services (in terms of quality, timeliness and efficiency), implement relevant, priority policies, and establish a predictable and well regulated environment for private sector growth and social development”. Equity is included in this goal through the emphasis placed on “access” as one of the criteria of improved service delivery. This is reflected in KRA 1 which has an outcome on “Systems and Structures in place to enhance access and the efficiency of service delivery” and in the outcome in KRA 4 on “Citizens and clients are aware increasingly aware of the availability of public services and their rights to access them”. Under KRA 3, equity is identified as one of the important principles underpinning the public service pay reform to be balanced alongside the ‘decompression required attracting and retaining qualified and experienced staff (p 48). At interview the DPS of PO-PSM advised that pay policy is about to be approved by Cabinet and it does include measures for attracting and retaining employees in LGAs that are under-served.
- **BEST:** The equity dimension is implied in the Programme Goal: “employment generation and poverty reduction through enterprise growth and enhanced competitiveness particularly among SMEs in Tanzania”. It is also reflect in Component 3 where the focus on commercial dispute resolution includes increasing access to the Commercial Court; and Component 4 where labour law reform includes consideration to the social responsibility of these laws.

3.8 LSRP value for money recommendations

The recent Mid-Term Review of LSRP included a value for money assessment.⁹ The final task of this Study is to examine the findings of this assessment and compare recommendations for the benefit of other core reforms.

3.8.1 Summary of LSRP VfM assessment

The assessment methodology involved the selection of a sample of procurement activities undertaken by different sector institutions across different categories including: goods; motor vehicles and consultancy services; construction activities and training programmes. The limitations on the assessment included the fact that the sample was small in size and most of the activities selected had taken place only recently (in the preceding 12 months). The sample consisted of 11 activities implemented by 8 institutions (reduced from the 25 activities originally identified because there was insufficient information on these activities).

The sample was then assessed against the following three elements of Value for money:

- Economy – whether the inputs have been acquired in the right amount, time, place, kind and quality, and at the right price.
- Efficiency – whether the maximum output was obtained from the inputs applied; and

⁹ The authors of the Mid-Term Review (PwC) clarify that assessment does not provide an ‘audit opinion’ as the methodology used did not follow International Standards on Auditing or International Standards on Review Engagements.

- Effectiveness – whether the outputs are contributing toward the planned outcomes.

The findings and recommendations of the assessment were:

Findings	Recommendations
GoT procurement systems and procedures are in place (eg. including procurement plans) and items are generally being procured in accordance with them.	Ensure that the monitoring of procurement is coordinated and strengthened, beginning with the M&E Unit with the procurement entity but including the PPRA and the NAO.
The short (less competitive) version of the tendering procedures tended to be preferred. This was justified on the grounds that the late approval of work-plans and late disbursement of funds meant there was little time left within the year in which to undertake procurement.	Institutions need to be encouraged to develop the habit of using procurement procedures which promote competition.
One major weakness was the lack of procurement records;	Build capacity of managers in the management of procurement records;
Another weakness was limited understanding of principle of value for money.	Develop a strategy that defines value for money and the responsibility of all directors and managers in pursuing it.

3.8.2 Relevance of LSRP VfM assessment for other Reforms

The Study Teams sees the findings and recommendations arising out of the VfM assessment as sound. They address a weakness in procurement which the government recognises as a problem existing across most MDAs. The key issue is to ensure that strategies to strengthen procurement capacity are coordinated with the PPRA, the government entity responsible for promoting and regulating the government’s procurement processes.

On the question of the methodology used for LSRP VfM assessment, the Study Team found opinions in interviews divided. Some felt that the assessment was useful, despite the limitations, while others felt that the limitations significantly reduced the veracity of findings. The view of the Study Team is firstly to commend LSRP for trialling new review approaches. However, we see several risks in the methodology used on LSRP which we suggest should be considered before application to other reforms:

- The LSRP VfM assessment has neither the power of a VfM audit (conducted according to International Standards on Auditing) nor an evaluation or review.
- If a VfM audit is to be conducted for reform programmes, there is a risk they will run parallel to the VfM audits already being conducted by the PPRA. By creating an additional audit, accountability in the programme might be strengthened but at the risk of overshadowing the learning dimension which is key purpose of evaluations. One option might be

for the reforms to conduct a ‘meta’ VfM audit of the PPRA audits to verify findings on relevant institutions.

- It is questionable whether a VfM audit provides a better understanding of how a reform is progressing from outputs to outcomes. While the LSRP VfM assessment tries to make this assessment, the use of efficiency and effectiveness criteria was acknowledged as being problematic. The assessment was mainly confined to MDA compliance with GoT procedures in the delivery of inputs. This is important information but needs to be complemented with other evaluative methodologies focussed on how the programme is influencing change.

A List of interviewees

Government of Tanzania

S/N	NAME	DESIGNATION	PROGRAMME
1	Hon PL Luhanjo	Chief Secretary	
2	Mr P Lymio	PS, PMO	BEST II
3	Eric Shitindi	Deputy Permanent Secretary-POPSM	PSRP III
4	Robert Mayaya	Coordinator-	NACSAP II
5	Emmanuel Mwanga	Assistant Coordinator	NACSAP II
6	Mathias Chitunchi	Assistant Coordinator	NACSAP II
7	Dr Hoseah	DG, PCCB	NACSAP II
8	Bede Lyimo	Coordinator	BEST II
9	Eliachim Maswi	Deputy PS, PMORALG	LGRP II
10		Director Policy and Planning	LGRP II
11	Fatma Kiongosya	Director of Planning (general Coordination)	PFMRP III
12	Ms Selina Mkony	Coordinator	PFMRP III
13	Olive Mhaiki	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Constitutional and Justice Affairs	LSRP
14	Juvenalis Motete	Coordinator	LSRP
15	Singi R. Madata	Coordinator, RCU	RCU
16	A.K.Tamayamali	Assistant Coordinator, RCU	RCU

Core Reform DP Leads:

S/N	NAME	DESIGNATION	PROGRAMME
1	Frank Holtmeier	Priority Area Coordinator, GTZ	LGRP
2	Adrian Stone	Growth Policy Advisor, DFID	BEST
3	Maury Miloff	Senior Governance Advisor, CIDA	LSRP
4	Janne Rajpar	Coordinator CIDA	LSRP
5	Wiveca Holmgren	First Secretary/ Controller, SIDA	NACSAP
6	Iina Soiri	Counsellor, Finnish Embassy	LGRP
7	Steve Lee	Co-Chair, UNDP	NASCAP
8	Denis Biseko	World Bank	PSRP/LSRP
9	Simon Gill	Deputy, DFID	PMRP
10	Ulrika Lang	First Secretary	NASCAP
11	Darren Welch	Head, DFID	CW3
12	Gerard Kiers	Technical Advisor	LGRP
13	Sanjeev Gupta	World Banks	PSRP

B Matrix: Key Institutional Arrangements across the Reforms

Institutional Arrangements	NACSAP	PFMRP	LSRP	PSRP	LGRP	BEST
High-level Government Leadership Mechanism	National Steering Committee, chaired by DG, PCCB	1. Steering Committee 2. Technical Working Group	1. The Steering Committee, chaired by CJ 2. JPIRC; 3. TWG	Management Committee, chaired by PS PO-PSM	1. Implementation Co-ord Comm, chaired by PS PMO; 2. Basket Fund SC	1. Tripartite Review Committee 2. Steering Committee
Programme Leadership	DG of PCCB, with GGCU (CJ)	PS Treasury & PS MoFEA	PS, MoCAJ	PS, PO-PSM	PS, PMO-RALG	PS, PMO
Programme Coordination	Implementation Unit, PCCB	DPS-Reform (MoFEA) Secretariat attached to Planning Division, MoFEA	Programme Coordination Office, MoCAJ	PO-PSM	DPS, PMO-RALG PMO-RALG	Investment & Private Sector Dev Division, PMO + assist by Business Regulatory Services
Key MDAs supporting implementation	GGCU and DPP	BoT, MoFEA, line Ministries, LGAs NAO, PPRA and Parliament.		MoFEA, PMO-RALG	Central MDAS, especially PO-PSM, MoFEA and MoJCA	MITM; MoHA; Lands; MoCAJ; MLEEYD; TIC; RITA
Institutions responsible for implementation	All MDAs and LGAs	All MDAs and LGAs	17 Sector Institutions	90 MDAs as well as LGAs	MDAs and LGAs	All MDAs
Other Implementation Coordination Mechanisms	Integrity Committees in MDA/LGAs	Policy & Planning MDAs and LGAs	Inter-Agency Committees	Demand-driven methodology	Central-Local Consultative Platform	MOUs between MDAs and PMO to define roles

C Matrix: Alignment of MKUKUTA to Reform Objectives

	MKUKUTA Targets (and Baseline)	Progress	Alignment with Reform Objectives	Progress	Aligned
2	Equitable Allocation of public resources with corruption effectively addressed				
2.1	Total revenue collected as ?% of revenue due at national level. No Baseline; No Target	2009 91%	Not aligned		✘
2.2	80% of procuring entities complying with the public procurement Act and procedures 2005 Baseline = 10%	2007 43.1%	PFMRP III Output 11.4: All MDAs and LGAs effectively using new procurement rules and regulations by 2010. Annual Report 08/09 says that PPRA has achieved an increase in MDA compliance to 13 PPA indicators from 43% to 66% PFMRP Independent Review 08/09 says that PPRA staff were to conduct training to improve procurement operations and procedures in MDAs and LGAs. But no 'contribution assessment is made?'	2009 66%	✓✓
2.3	% of government entities awarded clean audit certificates from NAO 2000/01 Baseline: MDAs = 41% LGAs = 10%	2007 MDAs = 71% LGAs = 54%	PFMRP III Output 16.5: Reduced number of qualified audit certificates in all MDAs and LGAs by 2010. NB. PFMRP Annual Progress Report 2008/09 does not provide progress update.	Not available	✓
2.4	? Number of corruption cases convicted as a % of number of investigated cases sanctioned for prosecution by the DPP 2001 Baseline = 38% ¹⁰ (Target not set)	2008 37% 2009 ¹¹	NB. NACSAP Goal 8 is to "Enhance the capacity of PCCB, GGCU and Director of Public Prosecution to deal with corruption, manage and implement NACSAP". This goal may be expected to contribute to the MKUKUTA target, but no details are provided in the Enhanced NACSAP II Strategy and Action Plan (May 2008) to demonstrate the specific link.	Not available	✓
2.5	? % LGAs that receive the full calculated amount of the annual formula based budget allocation No Baseline; No Target	2009/10 3% ¹² Target = 100%	NB. PFMRP Output 3: Improved predictability of resources availability to LGAs;3.1 The variance between case transferred to LGAs and monthly budget is within 1% by 2010. This output may contribute to the MKUKUTA target but it is not specified.	Not available	✓
2.6	Total value of revenue received from concessions and licences concessions and licences for mining, forestry fishing and wildlife as % of their estimated economic value No Baseline; No Target	Not available	Not aligned		✘

	MKUKUTA Targets (and Baseline)	Progress	Alignment with Reform Objectives	Progress	Aligned
3	Effective public service framework in place to provide foundation for service delivery improvements and poverty reduction				
3.1	% of population reporting satisfaction with Government Services (education, health and water) 2004 Baseline: 25-50%; No target	2008 Education = 81% Health = 64% Water = 42%	PSRP II Executive Logframe Goal Level Category: Service Delivery and Policy Satisfaction: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WBI regulatory quality index (on a scale of 0-1): 2004 Baseline = 0; 2011/12 Target = 0/5 • % of Citizens dissatisfied with Local Government Service Delivery (figure halved); 2004/05 Baseline = 75%; 2011/12 Target = 37.5% • % of Citizens dissatisfied with Central Government Service Delivery (figure halved); 2004/05 Baseline = 25%; 2011/12 Target = 12.5% Source: PSRP Results Framework M&E Strategy (Volume II) (July 2007)	2008/09 Not Available ¹³	✓
3.2	% of population who found key service providers to be absent when they needed a service 2004 Baseline: 53%; No target	Not available	This is a low-level indicator that is not currently being tracked under PSRP-II. However, there are a number of higher-level indicators which can only be met if key service providers are present to deliver a needed service eg. KRA 4: Accountability and Responsiveness: Outcome: Citizens and clients are increasingly aware of the availability of public services and their rights to access them <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of MDAs receiving at least 50 service delivery complaints per year Outcome: Louder voices in demanding for better access and quality of services <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % of citizens who believe public servants are treating them with courteousness Outcome: Public servants listen better; they are courteous and responsive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % of citizens requests for information that were met by government 		✓

4. Not reported in the PSRP Annual Report 2008/09

	MKUKUTA Targets (and Baseline)	Progress	Alignment with Reform Objectives	Progress	Aligned
4	Rights of the poor and vulnerable groups are protected and promoted in the justice system				
4.1	% of court cases outstanding for two or more years 2000 Baseline: 70%; Target = 40%	2008 10.8% ⁵	Partly covered under LSRP KRA 1: National Legal Framework; Outcome 2 Streamlined and strengthened prosecution and investigation system. In the recent MoCAJ Indicators Handbook (November 2009), Indicator 1.1.3: “% of court cases investigated and prosecuted within one year increases at increasing rate by 2012” and 2.3.1 “% of cases pending for 2 years and more (in rural areas)”. NB. The handbook notes the MKUKUTA indicator. NB. LSRP recently completed study on court case backlogs (April 2009)	2009 25.9% ⁶	✓
4.2	% of prisoners in remand for two or more years compared to all prisoners in a given year 2005 Baseline: 15.7%; Target = 7.5%	2008 5.4%	Covered under LSRP KRA 2: Access to Justice for the poor and disadvantaged; Outcome 1 Improved access to Justice for Persons in remand homes and prisons; Output 1: Cases screened by magistrates in remand home and prisons. The MKUKUTA indicator has been directly incorporated into the new LSRP M&E Plan (Indicator 2.1.1, MoCAJ Indicators Handbook) Check to see if included in April 2009 Study.	Not available	✓✓
4.3	% of detained juveniles accommodated in juvenile remand homes No Baseline; No Target	Not available	Now partly covered under the new LSRP M&E Plan: KRA 2: Outcome 4: Improved Custodian and Court Facilities for Juvenile Offenders; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2.4.1: % of juveniles attended in police stations and/or accommodated in juvenile remand homes. (As a Baseline it is note that no were no juvenile facilities in police stations in 2009; Target: By 2011 juvenile facilities will be installed in 12 police stations Dar, Coast and Shinyanga Regions) 	Not available	✓
4.4	% of districts with a team of trained Paralegals No Baseline; No Target	Not available	Partly covered under LSRP KRA 2: Access to Justice for the poor and disadvantaged; Outcome 1: Enhanced Legal Aid and Dissemination of Legal Information. Now better covered under the new LSRP M&E Plan: KRA 2: Outcome 2: Enhanced legal aid and dissemination of legal information; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2.2.1: Number of people assisted by the Legal Aid Groups (data disaggregated by Wards, Districts, Regions and Gender) (No Baseline; Target = 25% of wards covered) 	Not available ⁷	✓✓

⁵ This figure is taken from MAIR 2008/09—these figures do not seem to match those in the MMP (2006)

⁶ This figure is taken from a study of court case backlogs from 2004-2008 undertaken by MoCAJ, LSRP and NBS (April 2009). (see MTR November 2009)

⁷ LSRP MTR (November 2009) reports zero progress on Outcome 2: Output 5 “Legal aid groups and centres established at regional, district and ward levels”



	MKUKUTA Targets (and Baseline)	Progress	Alignment with Reform Objectives	Progress	Aligned
5	Reduction of political and social exclusion and intolerance				
5.1	Number of cases filed on infringement of human rights 2005 Baseline: 12,343 (handled) 7,111 (solved)	2008/09 2,341 ⁸	Partly covered by LSRP KRA 3: Human rights and Administrative Justice, particularly <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outcome 1: Law enforcement agencies observe human rights • Outcome 2: Strengthened Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance NB. The MKUKUTA indicator covered under the new LSRP M&E Plan: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3.2.1 Public/Stakeholders opinion on performance of the Human Rights Commission/increase in % of stakeholders who are satisfied with complaint resolution to 90% (no baseline) 	Not available	✓

⁸ Progress figure from MAIR 2008/09 does not seem to be consistent with the Baseline figures provided in the MMP (2006).

	MKUKUTA Targets (and Baseline)	Progress	Alignment with Reform Objectives	Progress	Aligned
6	Improved personal and material security, reduced crime, eliminate sexual abuse and domestic violence				
6.1	Average no of inmates per facility as % of authorised capacity 2005/06 Baseline = 96.3% overcrowding; No Target	2008 151% ⁹	MKUKUTA Indicator not clearly covered under LSRP		x
6.2	Number of cases of crime reported Baseline 2002 Court of Appeal = 91 High Court = 2047 District Courts = 39167 Target not set	2008 Court of Appeal = not available High Court = 9537 District Courts = 24,002	MKUKUTA Indicator not clearly covered under LSRP		x
6.3	% of cases of sexual abuse filed as a % of all cases No Baseline; No Target	Not available	MKUKUTA Indicator not clearly covered under LSRP		x
6.4	% who agree that a husband is justified in hitting or beating his wife for a specific reason (women/men) 2004/05 Baseline Women = 59.6% Men = 42% Target not set	Not available	MKUKUTA Indicator not clearly covered under LSRP		x

⁹ Progress figure from MAIR 2008/09 does not seem to be consistent with Baseline figures provided in the MMP (2006).



	MKUKUTA Targets (and Baseline)	Progress	Alignment with Reform Objectives	Progress	Aligned
7	National Cultural Identities enhanced and promoted				
7.1	No outcome indicators developed				

KEY:

- ✓ = aligned
- ✗ = not aligned
- ✓✓ = strongly aligned

D Matrix: Conflict and Synergies across the Reforms

Potential Sources of Synergy and Conflict	NACSAP PCCB	PFRMP MOFEA	LSRP MoCAJ	PSRP PO-PSM	LGRP PMO-RALG	BEST PO-PC
LGRP: D by D - Institutionalising functions and systems	✓	✓	✓	✓	LEAD	✓
LGRP: D by D – Harmonising laws across government	✓	✓	Engaged	✓	LEAD	✓
BEST: Commercial Dispute Resolution			Engaged			LEAD
BEST: Business Activity Registration					Engaged	LEAD
BEST: Business Regulation		Engaged				LEAD
PSRP: Systems for Pay, Incentives, and Rewards	✓	✓	✓	LEAD	✓	✓
PSRP: Decentralised Human Resource Management	✓	✓	✓	LEAD	✓	✓
PSRP: Leadership Development	✓	✓	✓	LEAD	✓	✓
PFRMP: Financial Management Systems	✓	LEAD	✓	✓	✓	✓
PFRMP: Audit Functions	✓	LEAD	✓	✓	✓	✓
NACSAP: Ethics and Integrity Committees	LEAD	LEAD	✓	LEAD	✓	✓
NACSAP: Ethics&Integrity Bodies (PPRA, NAO, Judiciary)	LEAD	✓	✓			



Potential Sources of Synergy and Conflict	NACSAP PCCB	PFRMP MOFEA	LSRP MoCAJ	PSRP PO-PSM	LGRP PMO-RALG	BEST PO-PC
Accountability to citizens	✓	✓		LEAD	✓	✓
Planning, Budgeting, Monitoring and Evaluation	✓	LEAD MTEF	✓	LEAD Planning	✓	✓
Change management	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mainstreaming	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Capacity Development	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coordination	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
PSRP: Diversity Issues	✓	✓	✓	LEAD	✓	✓
PSRP: HIV	✓	✓	✓	LEAD	✓	✓

E Matrix: Integration of Cross-Cutting issues into Reform Strategies and M&E Frameworks

	Gender	HIV and AIDs	Vulnerable Groups ¹⁴
NACSAP PCCB	Not integrated (not mentioned in Strategy)	Not integrated (not mentioned in Strategy)	Not integrated (not mentioned in Strategy)
PFMRP MOFEA	Not integrated (not mentioned in Strategy)	Not integrated (not mentioned in Strategy)	Not integrated (not mentioned in Strategy)
LSRP MoCAJ	<p>Not yet integrated but action being taken:-</p> <p>LSRP has just recruited a Gender Adviser, who will also be responsible for other diversity issues. They will develop a mainstreaming strategy and ensure these issues are incorporated at from the start in the work-planning process.</p> <p>Mid-Term Review recommended a number of measure for mainstreaming gender into all KRA. Particularly areas already identified in the MTS include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KRA 1: National Legal Framework—reviewing laws impeding access to justice women, 	<p>Not integrated, although the issue is mentioned in the Strategy in the following areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KRA 1: National Legal Framework—includes activities to review compliance of laws with governments Human Rights, Gender and HIV policies. • KRA 4: Human Rights—include an NGO initiative which also involves NGOs specialising in HIV and AIDs. 	<p>Not integrated, although mentioned in the strategy in the following areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KRA 1: National Legal Framework—includes activities to review laws impeding access to justice for the poor and marginalised groups including women, children and disabled people. • KRA 2: Access to Justice; Outcome 4: Improved Custodian and Court Facilities for Juvenile Offenders and other activities to strengthen juvenile justice.

	Gender	HIV and AIDs	Vulnerable Groups¹⁴
	<p>children and disabled people.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KRA 2: Access to Justice—the Legal Aid and Literacy Network includes women-focussed NGOs. <p>New M&E framework specifies that gender disaggregated data will be collected.</p>		
<p>PSRP PO-PSM</p>	<p>Partially integrated, but could be strengthened.</p> <p>KRA 5: Systems for Managing Public Servants; Broad Intervention 3 focuses on the management of diversity in the Public Service. This is to implement the law which eliminate discrimination in the workplace by gender, disabilities, religion, ethnicity, age, race, multicultural</p> <p>In Phase II a study is to be done to propose a way of mainstreaming diversity into HR management – ie.recruitment performance appraisal and leadership develop;</p> <p>Also develop guidance on how to mainstream diversity issues.</p> <p>M&E Framework:</p>	<p>In phase 1, guidelines on the management of HIV/AIDs interventions in the work place were developed, based on the National HIV/AIDs policy and strategy. This will be following up in Phase II</p>	<p>Not explicitly mentioned but covered under KRA 5: Diversity in the Public Service.</p>

	Gender	HIV and AIDs	Vulnerable Groups¹⁴
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measures % of women in decision-making posts. • Measures % of women who have completed Masters degrees and have assumed 'decision-making posts'. 		
LGRP PMO-RALG	<p>Diversity agenda articulated and mainstreamed (with priority on gender issues) by 2011</p> <p>gender will be mainstreamed throughout the programme, but is most significant in this component, e.g. in the holistic participatory planning, O&OD, and civil society participation.</p> <p>Has indicator to measure number of women appointed to management position in LGAs</p> <p>Some gender disaggregated data being collected at the LGA level</p> <p>It has been observed, in a study by PMO-RALG, that women's voices are filtered out in the process when village plans are integrated into district-level plans. Issues of diversity must be consistently addressed. Men and women have different perspectives and</p>	<p>Another important cross-cutting issue, HIV/AIDS, will be mainstreamed in HR activities of the programme, in line with GoT policy. It is not addressed specifically in this document as it was considered not to be a specific local government reform issue.</p>	<p>It would seem logical that Vulnerable Groups would form part of the Diversity Agenda, although they are not specified</p>

	Gender	HIV and AIDs	Vulnerable Groups¹⁴
	<p>experiences in areas of local governance. Women, for example, play an important role in social service sectors, like health, education and water. The programme must ensure all different sections of society are heard and engaged.</p>		
<p>BEST PO-PC</p>	<p>that gender indicators be incorporated in component logframes and the M&E system, and that a senior staff member be appointed for co-ordination of all these aspects of performance monitoring.</p> <p>To ensure that the BEST Programme promotes equality of men and women to conduct business, BRU commissioned a report on mainstreaming gender into the BEST Programme in September 2007. Among priority actions recommended were that gender indicators be incorporated in component logframes and the M&E system, and that a senior staff member be appointed for co-ordination of all these aspects of performance monitoring.</p> <p>These recommendations have been actioned. In addition, links with the coordinator of the IFC "Gender &</p>	<p>Through its SME Development Policy, the Government of Tanzania has committed to continuity in the implementation of programmes that control the spread of HIV/AIDS amongst SME operators, but apart from accomplishing preparations for the HIV/AIDS Code of Conduct at Workplaces, and ensuring that this is printed, translated and widely distributed, concrete actions to be taken under BEST are yet to be developed. The Programme will allocate financial resources for specific activities in this area as considered appropriate after consultations with professionals regarding options that provide maximum impact</p>	

	Gender	HIV and AIDs	Vulnerable Groups¹⁴
	<p>Economic Growth in Tanzania” implementation initiative are being taken forward so as to ensure that BEST works in tandem with other stakeholders in delivering the prioritized reforms listed in this study.</p> <p>BRU is also committed to raising awareness on the links between gender equality and competitiveness: it has contributed articles on this theme for publication in PSCP’s Competitive Edge, and is now working a ‘popular’ easy-to-read version of the IFC “Gender & Economic Growth in Tanzania” study, which will be translated into Kiswahili for widespread distribution.</p> <p>BRU is also committed to ensuring that Tanzania’s methodology for Regulatory Impact Assessment will incorporate gender disaggregated impact.</p>		

F Interview Guide

MKUKUTA Review: Interview Guide

Objective of the study to: “**assess the progress made in core reforms’ implementation and determine their impact on attainment of MKUKUTA Objectives**”. This will include an assessment of the leadership and capacity of the government to manage the large number of reform programmes currently in place.

Interviewees will be asked open-ended questions under the following five areas. Not all questions will be relevant to all interviewees. The interviewees’ role in the reform programme will determine their ability to answer some of these questions. The questions are meant as a guide only to frame the discussion; ensure the objectives of the assignment are meant; and bring consistency to interviews being conducted by different team members.

1 General Question on overall Progress in implementation of reform?

- How do you describe the change this reform programme is trying to achieve? What is the programmes strategy for achieving this change?
- How do you track what is happening on the reform? How do you know the reform is making a difference? How do you know what the problems are?
- When do you think the programme will have achieved it’s objectives?
- How has the reform programme performed over the last two to three years as measured in the Performance Assessment Framework and other measures? Ask interviewee for their own thoughts on progress and if they believe the assessment is a fair representation of progress. To facilitate this discussion also ask the following:
 - What is the best achievement the reform programme since you have been involved with it?
 - What is the biggest challenge to implementation?
 - What do you see as a realistic pace for implementation and how do you determine this pace
- What do you see as some of the bottlenecks in the implementation? Why are they bottlenecks? What is the solution? Topics that might
 - Eg. Cover issues such as political will, leadership, capacity (both skill levels and number of people);

- Relating to the above, where do you see the greatest resistance? What role do you think donors (through the dialogue structure) can have in helping to overcome this resistance?
 - What are the equity issues in service delivery for BEST?
- 2 How can the institutional approach and/or administrative arrangements of the reform programmes be strengthened/stream-lined to achieve better outcomes?**
- Issues to be covered in this section include
 - Is the reform mainstreamed and how has this effected implementation? What were your **expectations** for of how mainstreaming would effect implementation?
- 3 How can the Reform Coordination Unit support the MDAs who are implementing the reforms**
- The goals include to: (1) strengthen the lines of upward accountability within government around the reform programmes; (2) identify the synergies and overlaps between reforms. The RCU has only been operating a short-time, but have you seen any examples of where the
- 4 How can the reform programmes contribute to the timely achievement of the MKUKUTA goals?**
- Have you seen much evidence that the implementation of the reform programme is being guided by the goals of the MKUKUTA? Why or Why not?
 - Has a strong linkage be made between the goals of the reform programme and the goals of MKUKUTA? Ie. Is there a tight linkage etc.
- 5 How can the reform programme M&E Frameworks be strengthened and better integrated into the MKUKUTA M&E systems?**
- What is the status of the M&E systems on do they fit with MKUKUTA.
 - Do you see much demand for M&E information coming from the government? Is there a danger that donor demands for information will undermine government demand?
- 6 Other issues?**
- Are you aware of the Value for Money audit recently conducted on the LSRP? Do you think this would be a good tool to also apply to BEST

G **References**

To be added.



H Terms of Reference